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ABSTRACT
This study attempts to analyze whether oil and gas exploitation
in a semi-enclosed sea will result in closer relations being developed
in the region leading to the establishment of a special regime for that
sea. The study area is Northwestern Europe which is centered on the
North Sea. A1l the littoral states of Northwestern Europe have major
interests in the North Sea, one of which is oil and gas exploitation.
This study is developed throu~h the examination of the activities
in the North Sea, related to oil and gas production, which tend to
join the region together followed by an analysis of those factors
which would retard the regionalization process. Of particular
imp~rtance is whether the inhibiting factors in the North Sea are long
or short term problems.
First. an overview of the North Sea resources is given to demon-
strate their nature and the problems associated with offshore activities.
Next, two theories of regional integration are examined, Communications
Theory and Neo-functionalism. Aspects of both these theories are
important in determining whether· regionalisa is increased by subsea
oil and gas 'activities. Then the existing level of regionalism is
shown by a history of organizational development in Northwestern
Europe, as well as the presentation of info~tion on economic, social,
and institutional interdependencies.-
The centripetal forces for regionalism include boundary delimita-
tion. pollution agreements, resource agreements, fisheries arrangements,
ii
oceanographic organizations y and multi-national corporations. The
inhibiting factors for regional cohesion are conflict in the uses
of the sea, the multiplicity of national laws in the sea, and
governmental attitude on the North Sea as expressed by production
t~etables for North Sea oil and gas.
After a careful examination of the significance of both opposing
forces in the North Sea. the findings were that regionalism, for the
moment p is not being appreciably strengthened by oil and gas activities
in the area. This was because: 1) Norway, soon to be an oil exporter,
has developed policies which are contrary to the interests of the
rest of Northwestern Europe, 2) No methods have been created whereby
all the countries in the region can respond to each others' needs and
prob~e~, 3) The organizational structures in Northwestern Europe
have not yet succeeded in promoting definitive regional programs
directed toward the North Sea resources; and 4) The formal acceptance
of continental shelf boundaries separates the North Sea into zones of
control which has resulted in the countries viewing 011 and gas problems
8S national not regional.
There was found to be. however, pressure in the area for the
development of a regional consensus that would eventually lead to
the establis~ment of a special regime for the North Sea. Pollution
problems, conflicts in the sea, the need to harmonize oil activities,
and the existing infrastructure in Northwestern Europe are areas which
focus attention on the need for compromise in the area. With this
1i1
pressure in mind, a regime for the North Sea is proposed. Finally,
the applicability of the study to other regions is examined and four
points are suggested which would be important if studies of this type
are done on other sea regions.
Iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the industTialization of man's soci~ty, there has been a
need to fuel the mechauization so vital to its success. From human
labor to waterpower, coal, and then 011 and gas, man has searched for
the means to satisfy his appetite for energy. The recent Arab oil
embargo has emphasized the delicate balance that exists between main-
tenance and total disruption of man's way of life due to his dependence
on energy. Moreover, as the availability of hydrocarbons declines,
there is increased competition for the resources that remain.
In a region occupied by sevecal nations the discovery of new
deposits of oil and gas could r~sult in two events; disharmony and
decay of the relations among the states as a result of acrimonious
disputes over the oil, or an increase in cohesion and regional stability
which will come from the reco~1tion that all the states will benefit
by the efficient management and use of these resources.
The effect of hydrocarbons on a region is more pronounced if the
resources are found offshore in the continental shelf shared by all
the countries. Ownership of the oil and its importance, compared to
the other uses of the sea, are questions which must be resolved before
exploitation can take place. Northwestern Europe,1 centered around the
North Sea, is one such region where the presence of offshore energy
lror the purposes of this study the region of Northwestern Europe
is composed of Norway, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany. Belgium,
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France. Ireland and the United Kin~dom.
See "Study Areal! in this chapter for the reason behind the selection of
this area.
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resources can increase regionalism through the development of a
common approach to, and management of, offshore oil and gas.
The purpose of this thesis is twofold; to detect whether
exploitation of· North Sea 011 and gas resources increases regional
cohesion, and to determine whether the presence of these resources
will encoura~e the creation of a special regime) for the North Sea.
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY
It should be stated that this paper is a study of a political
region, and the spatial processes within that region which result
fro~ the presence of a natural resource. Trad~tionally. geographers
have been associated with the study of regions and its areal ':omponents
but, when studying the process of regional political cohesion and
integration, the contributions from the field of geography are found
lacking. The structure of the nation-state and the environment in
which it works have been thorou~hly studied. However, the various
processes taking place within the state or among several states have
not been adequately studied. In this fact this study finds its pur-
pos~: to help advance politico-geographic knowledge and its literature
by examining how the presence of vital resources within an area can
encourage or retard the process of regionalizat~on.
2Re~ionalism is an idea, feeling or sense of closeness created
by a group of states workin~ together to solve common problems peace-
fully. Regionalization is the process by which closeness and inter-
dependence are created and maintained. It may be a forerunner to, but
does not necessarily result in, political integration.
3A special regime would be an intergovernmental or supranational
organization which would set certain policies in the sea that are
binding on all member states.
3Furthermore, the process of regionalizatlon being examined in
this study is centered around the sea. As the nations of the world
extend their sovereignty farther out into the seas and oceans to con-
trol the resources found there. will political regions that border on
seas seek to extend special jurisdictional arrangements over that
sea? If so, what kind of controls would these arrangements entail?
A determination of the question of whether the process of regionaliza-
tion will result in regional controls over the sea would be a definite
benefit not only for the field of Reography but also in studies on the
law of the sea.
FORMULATICN OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
Statement of the Problem
The effect that development of a particular ocean resource can
have on the process of re~ionalization is the subject of this thesis.
The problem can be stated concisely; Have regional ties been strengthened
or eroded in Northwestern Europe by the discovery of oil and gas in the
North Sea? Furthermore. is there a movement toward the development of
a special regime in the North Sea to use and protect the oil and gas
resources?
Nature of the Problem
This problem has been particularly designed to determine how off-
shore oil and gas resources can increase or diminish the process of
regional1zation. The case study is of the North Sea resources, but it
is hoped that the flndin~s here can be applied to other areas of the
world. The study itself will first examine the background of the recent
4011 and gas exploration and exploitation in the North Sea, and to give
a general outlook on the difficulties and potential of these resources.
The second step in the problem will be to provide a foundation
for the case study by considering the theoretical basis behind the
process of regionalization, as well as that behind social and political
integration.
Next, the centripetal forces present in Northwestern Europe. other
tqan the interest in oil and ga~ deposits, will be examined. This
section will develop a perspective on the base level of regionalism
which is subject to the influences of offshore oil and gas exploitation.
The fourth step will be to examine co-operation to date among the
littoral states of the North Sea as it pertains to offshore oil and
gas. This section will look at bilateral and multilateral treaties
dealing with shelf areas of national jurisdiction, pollution from oil,
·and resources that cross jurisdictional boundaries. Also of interest
will be agreements to send resources of one country to other countries.
After examining co-operative efforts, the problems preventing
increased regionalism will then be examined. This will encompass
differing national legislation on leasing arrangements and exploita-
tion of the North Sea resources, potential conflicts between oil and
gas exploration and other uses of the sea, and differing objectives
and timetables in 0il and gas exploitation. These aspects will be
examined to see if they will create any permanent centrifugal forces
which would count~ract the process of regionalization in Northwestern
Europe. Finally, a consideration will be made of the effect that
regionalism will have on the law of the sea, and whether studies of
•5
this type can be applied to the development of regionalism in other sea
areas of the world.
Origin ~ the Problem: Review of Relevant Literature
Since World War II one of the most pervasive occurrences in the
political geography of the world is the developmen~ of a regional out-
look and intra-regional ties. Through a common ideology or other
catalyst, the countries of the world are looking for regional solutions
to satisfy common problems. Such regional economic Qrganizations as
the EEC, defense arrangements as SEAT0 9 and political groups as the Arab
League are just some of the manifestations of this urge toward regionalism.
This trend may also in time be evident in the Law of the Sea wbere areas
of the world may band together to find a solution to common marine
problems. A discussion of this possibility can be found in Dr. Lewis M.
Alexander's article entitled, "Regionalism and the Law of the Sea: The
Case of Semi-enclosed Seas.,,4 In this article, Dr. Alexander discusses
the possibility of special jurisdictional arrangements being established
within semi-enclosed seas to protect the interests of the bordering
countries. Here, then, is the origin of this problem. Will regionalism
in Northwestern Europe b~ increased by interest in the North Sea oil
and gas, and will regional controls be extended to this area to protect
the littoral states?
When studying various aspects of the problem under discussion 9 a
fair amount of information comes to light. While there is no substantive
4Le~s M. Alexander, "Regionalism and the Law of the Sea: The Case
of Sem~-enclosed Seas," Ocean Development and International Law 2 (Fall
1974): 151-186.
6work on the effect that offshore energy resources have had on regionalism,
there 1~ a great amount of literature written on political and economic
regions and regiona1i~~tion. These studies fall basically into two
categories; 1) what criteria does one use to delimit an international
5region, and what unique characteristics does that region have? ; and
2) what are the forces which foster political integratlon?6 There are
also numerous studies on the European area 1n particular. 7 The problems
and potential of North Sea oil and gas are also well represented in this
literature. 8 All these works give a broad picture of Northwestern Europ~,
offshore oil and gas, and the process of regionalization which will lend
support and background to this particular study.
5Brian J.L. Be(ry, IIAn Inductive Approach to the Regionalization of
Economic Development," in Essays .!!!. Geoftraphy anq Economic Development
edited by Norton Ginsburg, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).
pp. 78-107; Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International
System, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1967).
6Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community ~ ~h~ International Level:
Problems of Definition and Measurement, (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday &
Co., 1954); Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and
International Organization, (Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press:t 1964).
7Lewis M. Alexander, Offshore Geography £[ Northwestern Europe,
Association of American Geographers, Monograph Series No.3, (Chicago:
Rand McNally & Co., 1963); Mark W. Janis, "The Development of European
Regional Law of the Sea." Ocean Development and International Law, 1
(Fall 1973): 275-89; Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The
European and the Universal Process," International Organization, 15
(Summer 1961): 366-92.
8llNorth Sea Report," Ocean IndustD' 8 (February -1973); L.G. Weeks,
"Amazon Basin, North Sea Spark South American, European Play," World
Oil 176 (February 1973): 32-36; "The Search for and Production of Oil
and Gas With Particular Reference to the North Sea," Institute of
Engineers and Shipbuilders in Scotland, Trans_actions 113 (1972-73): 399-
438; Richard Young, "Offshore Claitps and Problems in the North Sea,"
American Journal of International Law 59 (July 1965): 505-22.
7HEntODOLOGY
Study Area.
The North Sea is a semi-enclosed sea of l69~OOO squa~e miles. 9
Eighty percent of its periphery is occupied by land area, Only eighteen
percent of this s~a is deeper than 200 meters, primarily in the area of
the Norwegian Trench. Besides being the source of the oil and gas, the
North Sea is an area of intensive fisheries activities and Is the site
of several of the largest ports of the world (see map 1).
The region of Northwestern Europe, for the purposes of this study,
is composed of Norway, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Nether.lands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom; all these countries border the North Sea except Luxembourg and
Ireland. Luxembourg is included because it is in a complete customs
union with Belgium and any economic impact on Belgium from the North
Sea will be equally felt in LUxembourg. Ireland has been selected
because it is an EEC member and has close trade ties with the United
Kingdom and the other North Sea countries. While Italy is also an BEC
member~ it cannot be a major consideration in this study because its
principal maritime interest is with the Meditteranean Sea and no,t the
North Sea.
The North Sea and Northwestern Europe have been selected as the
study area because; 1) there is a history of cooperation in the area
and this fact permits an examination to be made on the effect that the
9The physical dimensions of the North Sea are from Alexander,
"Regionalism and the Law of the Sea: The Case of Semi-enc.losed Seas,"
p. 178.
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North Sea oil and gas deposits have on the regionalism in the area;
2) there are no active disput.es in the area over who owns the oil and
almost all sea boundaries in the North Sea have been established (see
map 2); and 3) there is probably better data availability of this
particular region than on any other one in the world.
D~ta Employed
Extensive data exists in a variety of sources that relate to the
North Sea and its littoral states. The information provided a firm
basis for testing the hypotheses (see page 11). 1) All information for
an overview of the North Sea oil and gas resources was obtained from
petroleum and technical journals, especially World Oil and Ocean
Industry. That overview encompasses the problems and potential of
North Sea oil and gas. 2) Trade data and organizational 1nterrelation-
ships were acquired from the Yearbook ~ International Organizations
and from trade statistics published by the OECD, EEC, and the United
Nations. That information was used to demonstrate the extent to which
regionalization has already occurred. 3) Co-operative efforts directly
related to the North Sea can be acquired from treaties and periodical
materials. The Department of State's series, "Limits in the Sea It was
---'.--'-'- - - --'
helpful, as was Offshore and other journals. 4) Data on problems in
the North Sea which may inhibit the process of regionalization was
obtained from legal journals and other periodicals concerned with the
law of the sea and ocean management. Some of them are: the American
Journal of International Law, International and Comparative Law Quarterly,
and Ocean Deve~opment and Internat1onal,~' In all data categories
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mentioned above, information supplied by natlona~ information services
. was also employed.
Hypotheses
For a solution to the proble~ of the effect that offshore oil and
gas has on the pro~ess of regionalization. two hypotheses will be tested.
It is hypothesized:
1) That the high cost of imported oil and the incidence of oil and
gas in t~e North Sea will lead to an increased sense of regionalism in
Northwestern Europe because there are the common needs to share and
manage energy resources and to thereby lessen the adverse effects of
imported oil on the collective economies.
2) That one result of regionalism will be concerted pressure toward
the creation of a supra-national agency to protect the interests of
Northwestern Europe in the North Sea.
Specific Methodological Techniques
In a study of this type, the form of most of the information obtained
does not allow for quantification. What must be done, then, is a
meticulous analysis of all relevant information dealing with the pro-
cess of reg~onalizati.on in the North Sea area, with all conclusions
being inferred from the available data. This method, if done properly,
will give an objective solution to the problem. The·following is an
outline of the methodological technique to be employed in this study.
I} Establish, through a variety of indicators. that a certain level
of regionalism already exists in the area.
2) By means of a study of treaties and other bi-lateral or multi-
lateral agreements establish that there are also co-operative efforts
on the North Sea oil and gas resources. These facts will be used to
demonstrate an increase in regionalism~
3) National legislation and authoritative government statements
will show different attitudes on the North Sea oil and gas resources
and indicate inhibiting factors to regionalism. Most important is
whether these problems are long range in nat~re or can be easily solved.
4) The extent to which regionalism is increased and the probability
of the development of a special regime for the North Sea will be depen-
dent on whether the problems extant today are long range or short range
and what must happen to solve these problems.
Chapter 2
NORTH SEA OIL AND GAS IN PERSPECTIVE
.;...,.,..-- -- -- -- -- -- ..........~----:.,,;;,;;;;-::;;..
Today, the industrialized countries of Northwestern Europe are
engaged in a frantic search for a safe and dependable supply of energy
resources. As fuel consumption steadily increases there is a decline
in available reserves and a concurrent rise in the political problems
with the major oil exporting countries in the Middle East. Up to the
1970's Europe had been forced to import approximately 90% of the oil
it consumed and used very little natural gas, only manufactured gas.
Since 1970, however, large quantities of oil and gas have been found
amidst one of the greatest fuel m~rkets in the world. This discovery
of oil and gas in the North Sea could promote co-operation in North-
western Europe, or it could prove to be divisive for regional cohesion.
In order to analyze the forces that inhibit or encou~age regionaliza-
tion a firm understanding of the nature of the North Sea oil and gas
resources must be acquired.
Geology and Climatology £f the Nor~h Sea
The geology of the North Sea floor has all the attributes needed
for fuel reservoirs. Underlain by thick sediments, it is theorized
that the North Sea is a depression in the Northwest European sedimentary
basin. However, until the discovery of the Groningen natural gas field
in north-east Netherlands in 1959, little was known about the geological
structure in the North Sea and little prospecting was initiated. IO
1'0P.J. Walmsley, "Geology and Exploration," in North Sea Oil-The
Challenge and Implication. (Edinbourgh: Heroit-Wait University~973).
p. 3.
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Regionally, gas is found south of a line extending east from the English-
Scottish border. Both oil and ~as are found north of the line. ll The
gas deposits in the Southern sector consist of almost pure methane, and
probably originates from coal deposits deep in the sedimentary rocks.
The gas drifts upward until the proper trap is encountered. The Northern
sector has sediments from the Jurassic period and has salt domes and
other structures necessary for pools to develop. The oil and gas are
often found in conjunction with each other which necessitates a separa-
tion process. When geologists are searching for hydrocarbons, three
requirements must be met: 1) suitable source rocks, 2) suitable
reservoir rocks, and 3) suitable cap rocks. l2 When all these requirements
art! found together, then the potential for oil in the area is high. Once
the initial finds are made, and their nature determined, similar geo-
physical structures can be found in other areas of the sea floor, a fact
which makes exploratory operations easier.
When participating in exploratory drilling (and subsequently.
exploitation). a major problem facing offshore drilling is the set of
meteorological conditions in the marine area. It is said that the North
Sea has the most sustained bad weather of any ocean area in the world. I3
IIT.F. Gaskell. "Oil and G.as in the North Sea." in North Sea
Science, ed. E.D. Goldberg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973)~. 451.
12Walmsley, pp. 5-6.
13This type of statement appears so frequently throughout the lit-
erature on the North Sea that I feel that no specific citation is
necessary. The general meteorolo~ical conditions were obtained from
R. Hahn, "On the Climatology of the North Sea" found in North Sea Science,
ed. E.D. Goldberg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973), pp. 183-236.
Classified as a transition zone between continental and oceanic
climato·logy, the weather conditions exhibit extreme variability.
Situated near the path of the Atlantic Depressions, the North Sea is
frequently visited by these climatic phenom2na, and weather condi-
tions change rapidly and frequently. This incidence of conflicting
weather masses create numerous storms with winds and waves reaching as
high as 100 m.p.h. and 90 feet respectively. There are always many
clouds and high humidity. along with low visibility and frequent fog
conditions. Clear days are ve.ry rare and precipitation is high. All
phases of petroleum exploration and production must be geared to with-
stand these weather phenomena.
Technology and the North Sea
Given the adverse nature of the North Sea climat~, major advance-
ments in technology had to be perfected. One such advance is in the
area of drilling rigs. The traditional jack-up rig, which stands on
the ocean bottom and is used in shallow water, is not safe in deeper,
stormy waters. Instead, the semi-submersible is the rig destined for
wide use in the North Sea. These giant rigs are basically free-floating
and use large supports which are similar to pontoons. When drilling is
taking place, huge anchors are used to help the rig remain stationary.
Besides being able to drill in deeper water and withstand heavy wave
and wind conditions, these rigs are especially useful due to their
mobility. Constructed occasionally with eng!nes. they are either self-
propelled or can be towed from site to site under good weather conditions.
This fact is very important when exploratory wells are being drilled.
16
The mobility lessens the number of rigs needed in an oil or gas field,
with a resultant decline in expenses.
Another advance is the subsea completion of well-heads. This
allows the exploiting company to forego the necessity of completing
the well at the surface. It also preeludes the need for lengthy con-
ductor piping from the ocean floor, an advance that solves the danger
of pipe breakage in stormy seas. The work on the ocean floor is done
with the aid of an enclosed capsule, within which the men complete the
well-head. This development also allows the rig to maintain more wells
than it could otherwise.
After the exploration 1s complete and a field has commenced pro-
duction, the next problem is tra~sportlng the product to shore. The
main methods are either by tanker or pipeline. The use of tankers
creates a need for a large and expensive storage capacity on the ocean
floor, and increases the likelihood of pollution problems from leakage.
Furthermore, if bad weather persists, tanker loadings cannot be main-
tained and production may be suspended.
A pipeline, on the other hand, necessitates mile~ of pipe being
laid on the ocean floor and also represents a pollution hazard. It
could also interfere with fishing trawls and other marine activities
if the pipeline is not buried. For the present, a pipeline appears to
be the transportation medium favored by the petroleum companies.
Of all the North Sea countries, Norway has a particularly difficult
time in getting oil to shore. Due to the physiography of the Norwegian
Trench and resulting pipeline construction difficulty, the logistics
of getting oil and gas back to Norway are pr.ohibi~ive1y expensive. The
17
only feasible solution to the problem is to send oil and gas to other
countries by pipeline. In- the next few years oil from the Ekofisk
field is expected to go to Scotland, and gas from that field will move
to West Germany.14
Offshore Financing
Without a doubt o-ffshore oil and gas drilling 1s expensive. Despite
the fact that it 1s more expensive to drill offshore than on the land,
all the technological improvements dictated by the North Sea environment
increase the cost substantially. Financing the vast undertaking is a
pr±me concern of the big petroleum companies. In the two year period
ending in 1974, up to two billion dollars was to be spent on pipelines
alone. 15
As of October 1974, there were thirty-six semi-submersibles
operating in the North Sea costing, on the average, over ten million
dollars apiece. There are thirty-five more under construction with
price estimates on some of the larger ones being over thirty million
dollars. This outlay of over a billion dollars for semi-submersibles
represents the cost of only 71 out of 97 rigs which will be used in the
North Sea area in 1976. Add in the costs of shore facilities, leases,
communication equipment, and all other necessary supplies for the opera-
tion, and the cost is indeed stag~ering. To date, the best estimate
for the costs to 1980 reaches 12.5 billion dollars. 16
l4See Chapter 5 for a complete examination of the decision by Norway
to send its resources to other countries.
15"North Sea Oil Scramble," Duns Review 45 (December 1972): 109.
16 l1The Nortih Sea Rush," Time, VoL 94 (May 14,1973), p. 94.
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To raise the capital needed for the North Sea venture, two hundred
and fifty companies and consortiums, representing eleven countries, are
directly or indirectly involved. I7 Led by the major international
petroleum companies, the lease holders are continually searching for
new inputs of money. As a result of the financial burden, the companies
involved are borrowing heavily from banks and any other sources which
will loan them the money. The peculiar situation in the financing of
the North Sea oil and gas resources is exemplified by 8ritish Petroleum's
financing of one North Sea field, the Forties field. The 800.5 million
dollar loan from an International grotlp of banks 1s secured by the oil
recoverable from the field rather than by the general assets of the
company which would ordinarily have been used as security.18
Authority in Offshore Oil and Gas Exploitation
The legal authority to explore and exploit the seabed beyond
territorial waters resides in the Convention on the Continental Shelf
which was signed in Geneva in 1958 and came into force in 1964. It
gives exclusive rights to the coastal state for exploring and exploiting
the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areaS
adjacent to their coast to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit
to where the depth of the superadj acent waters admits exploitation. 19'
17''North Sea Stake Studied," New York Times, 20 September 1971,
p. 67:l.
18"BP Financing of Forties Field," Offshore Services 6 (April
1973): 50.
19United Nations, Convention on the Continental Shelf, Document
A/Conf. 13/LS3, Article 1. -----
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In a~eas~ such as the North Seat where there are many opposite and
adjacent countries. agreement on the boundary should be settled by the
parties involved. If, however, no agreement can be reached, and unless
another boundary is justified by special circumstance~ the boundary
will De a median line based on an equidistance principle. 20 Since its
eetablishment, the median line principle between adjacent countries has
been rejected by the World Court. 2l At this time, all shelf boundaries
in the North Sea have been established with the exception of those of
France and of Belgium.
With the Continental Shelf Convention as legal basis and the
establishment of most of the shelf boundaries in the North Sea, authority
over the zones resides with the coastal states. They decide leasing
arrangements and legislate any and all rules governin~ safety, pollu-
tion, or any other aspects of offshore oil and gas exploitation.
~nforcement of the laws is also the province of the coastal state.
However, there has been a gradual effort by the EEC to extend its con-
trol over the shelf through rules and regulation which should be adhered
to by the ~ember countries.
As to the question regarding EEC control over continental shelf
activities, the ruling was made that EEC regulations do apply to the
20Ibid , Article 6.
21See Chapter 5 for a complete examination of the dispute over
shelf boundaries between adjacent states and the le~al decision per-
taining to it. Also see, International Court of Justice~ 1969 North
.§!!. Case Judgment, The Hague.
20
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shelf of member countries. Also, an earlier decision was made to re-
gard offshore oil and gas as of internal origin for customs purposes. 23
With decisions such as these the EEC has decreed that national legisla-
tion on offshore oil and gas exploitation should fall within EEC
24guidelines. Authority still lies within t e coastal state but the
determination by the EEC encourages similarity between all laws.
International and Regional Perspective
Throughout all of the sectors of the North Sea exploration is pro-
g~essing. Gas has already been brought to market from the southern
area. and oil is expected to be produced in quantity in 1975. What
exactly the present and potential yields of oil and gas will contribute
to an energy hungry Europe is subject to intense scrutiny and debate by
the regional members. The oil and gas resou~ces must be put into
perspective to gain a full appreciation of their potential.
At the end of 1972 a representative of Philip's Petroleum estimated
present and potential reserves. Present proven recoverable reserves
in the North Sea were put at eleven billion barrels of liquids and
sixty trillion cubic feet of gas, and estimated recoverable reserves
22"European Economic Community," Bulletin of the European Communi-
ties 3 (November 1970): 48.
23"Common Market's Continental Shelf," European Community, No. 140
(November-December 1970): 22.
24The £EC guideline that is applicable to the offshore areas is
Article 52 of the Rome Treaty which states that restrictions on freedom
of entry on nationals will be abolished. For a complete discussion on
this point see Janis, p. 282.
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for the North Sea were forty-two billion and one hundred and ten trillion
respectively. 25 The estimated production rate for oil was put at over
3.5 million barrels per day in the early 1980's.26 The North Sea oil
fields are expected to last from twenty to thirty years at that rate.
However, any increase in the ~ate of production would correspondingly
decrease well life expectancy.
Rates vary. of course, within different national sectors. Approxi-
mate1y two-thirds of the total available or 2.4 million bId will come
from the British sector and about one-third or 970.000 bId from the
Norwegian sector. 27 Denmark, to this date, is the only other country to
have found oil tn their sector in commercial quantities.
At a conference on the North Sea the magnitude of the fir.ds was
put into perspective. The present proven recoverable reserv~s represent
only 5% of the world's oil excluding North America and the Socialist
bloc countries. With these reserves included, the find is even more
miniscule.
Taking Western Europe as a unit, it consumed in 1970 about eleven
million barrels of oil per day with an additional two million barrels
used by th~ British. 28 The present estimate is that North Sea oil will
25Robert f. King, "Petroleum Exploration and production.in Europe
in 1972," American Association of Petroleum Geologists, Bulletin 57
(October 1973): 1945. --
26Robert F. King, "Petroleum Exploration and production in Europe
in 1973," American Association of Petroleum Geologists, Bulletin 58
(October 1974): 1974.
27 Ibid, p. 1974.
28Jon Mclin, "Population Pressures and Resource Exploitation in
the North-East Atlantic," West Europe Series No.8 American University
Field Staff, !nc., 1913.
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produce 15% of the oil needed by Western Europe in 1980. 29 The pro-
jection assures the European countries of a continued dependenc~ on
Arab oil. Considering the fact that virtually all the 011 is owned by
two countries t the relative position of the rest of Europe worsens.
However t there are other areas in Europe where oil is also found, so
the energy picture may not be as bad as indicated above.
The prospects for natural gas in Europe are much better. One
hundred per cent of the projected gas consumption by four North Sea
states will be satisfied by domestic sources. 30 It must be emphasized.
however. that gas satisfies only a small part of the total energy
requirement of Northwestern Europe.
29"North Sea Oil May Effect Price Dispute," New York Times, 22
January 1973. sec. It p. 10.
30The countries expected to be self-sufficient in
Netherlands. Norway. the United Kingdom. and Denmark.
Sea Most Tempting," New York 'rimes, 20 September 1972,
gas are the
Found in ".North
65.:1.
Chapter 3
REGIONALI~M: A THEORETICAL BASIS
In the nineteenth century one legitimate means for 'the development
of larger political units was the use of force. As coercion declined
as an acceptable method for regional amalgamation t a variety of organi-
zational types3l were instituted through which regional communication
and policies could be promoted. These regional forums could serve
purely as informational vehicles which facilitate the flow 0'£ communica-
tions through0ut the region t or the organizations could be the means
whereby significant integration is developed. Operating within the
region. an organization can help the process of regionalization by
focusing on needs and issues th~t must be solved on a regional scale.
ConverselYt certain issues that cannot be resolved by regional institu-
tions could inhibit the development of regionalism. This study is
primarily concerned with how a single regional factor. offshore oil and
gas exploitation, effects the ongoing process of regi nalization in
Northwestern Europe, an area which has already embarked on a path
toward the development of closer re~ional ties.
One important aspect of the development of regional institutions
and policies is the search for theories through wnich to understand the
pTocesses that are taking place. This study will use parts of DNO of
the more important theories for the development of regional integration.
31These organizational types cou14 be in the realm ~f the economic.
political, defense, or other area which 1s of regional importance.
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First is the communications approach to regionalization. This
theory, as expoused by Karl Deutsch, studies transaction flows in an
area in order to determine the extent and intensity of communications
between political groups and units. A high level of transactions would
indicate a good potential for regionalism.
The other theory is neo-functionalism whose proponents are Ernst
Haas, Joseph Nye, and others. This theory examines the influence that
regional economic organizations have on the development of political
integration. Both theories have some similar concepts which are of
practical value in this study.
The Communications Approach
Communications theory sees transactions such as trade, mail, and
telephone calls as prime indicators of the presence of regional integra-
tion. For Deutsch, the primary developer of this theory, integration
that is developed through these transactions would insure the attainment
of institutions and practices strong enough to assure a long peried of
peaceful changes among its population. 32 Regions can institutionalize
this integration by the formation of an amalgamated security community33
in which ~o or more previously independent units are me~ged into a
larger unit with a common government, or a pluralistic on~ which retains
32Karl~. Deutsch, et. al. Political Community: North Atlantic
Area, (New York: Greenwood Press, 19S7r~ p. 2.
33A security community is one in which there are real aSsurances
that the members of the community will not fight each other physically,
but will settle these disputes in some other way. Karl Deutsch, et al.
p.5.
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the legal independence of separate governments. 34 NATO would be an
example of a security community with an integrative potential.
With the appearance of increased transactions within a region
leading toward integration, specific attributes are developed upon which
the maintenance of regionalism 1s based. The first attribute is
"compatibility of major values" which are policies that are important
within all partners and important in the relations between partners. 35
The second is "mutual responsiveness" through which trust and acceptance
of all regional members is facilitated by the ability to respond quickly
and accurately to the events taking place in the region. 36
Communications theory is one of the oldest methods for studying
re~ional integration and has been criticized by many writers. However,
in some cases, the theory has proved to be viable. Within the Latin
America Free Trade Association (LAFTA), a correlation has been noted
in the lack of trade transactions with the failure of community
structures being developed in the region. 37 Also, trade Bnd service
interconnections in the East African Common Market (EACM) have held
conflict among its members, particularly Kenya and Tanzania, in check.
While after independence policies between the countries have diverged,
34Ibid p. 6.,
35Ibid p. 123.,
36Ibid p. 129.,
37Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration," in Regional
Integration ed. Leon N. Lindber~ and Stuart A. Schiengold, (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 25.
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the existence of economic ties and the consequent ease of communicati~ns
have p,roved to be beneficial in ending potential disputes. The existence
of transactions flows focuses attention on each other's policies and
allow the me~bers of the EACM to respond adequately to the events that
threaten the organization. 38 Communications theory does have practical
value and is a part of several re~ional studies.
Neo-Functionalism
Traditional functionalist theory sees tbe world's social ills being
solved, outside the spectrum of politics, by individuals working through
39international organizations. With the development of regional economic
organizations, this theory was modified into neo-functionalism to
syst~matize the events taking place in Europe in the 1950's. The theory
1s based on the idea that the creation of an economic union will 1n-
stigate forces which will lead to political integratio~. Integral to
this concept 1s the idea that if one sector of the economy, agriculture
for example, 1s brought under regional controls then an imbalance with
other sectors of the national economy will be created. This circumstance
w~ll be best resolved by bringing these other sectors under regional
controls. As the pressure for institutionalization of activities on a
regional scale in~reases, then more and more loyalty flows to the
regional center as it answers the interests previously satisfied by the
38Joseph S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in
Regional Integration, (Boston: Little Brown & Co., -1971), pp. 123-125.
39See Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and
International Organization.
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national government. In this way the regional economic organiza-
tion progressively integrates the area politically through economic
activities.
Since this theory ~as first developed by Haas and others, it has
come under attack because of its dependence on the European model and
the problems encountered by its use in the study of o,ther regional
economic systems. In order to overcome its deficiencies in comparative
studies Joseph Nye has revised the theory to make it more comprehensive.
For the accurate appraisal of what is taking place in an economic
region Nye developed an unwieldly complex of variables. They consist
of seven process mechanisms4l and seven variables for integrative
pot.ential which were broken down further into four structural condi-
tions and three perceptual conditions. 42 Within this study the
structural conditions are of particular interest and will be discussed
further in this paper.
Neo-functionalism has proven to be a viable theory not only in
Europe 'but in other economic regions as well. In the organizational
development of Europe, The European Coal and Steel Community was the
40J •S• Nye, "Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist
Model," in Regional Integration, ed. Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A.
Schiengold, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 196.
4lThe process mechanisms are: functional linkage of tasks, rising
transactions. deliberate linkages and coalition formation, elite sociali-
zation, regional group fo~tion, ideological-indentitive appeal, and
involvement of external actors.
42Yithin the integrative potential the structural conditions are:
symmetry or economic equality of units. elite value complementarity,
existence of pluralism, and capacity of member states to respond; the
perceptual conditions are: perceived equity of distribution of benefits,
perceived external cogency, and lo~ visible costs. J.S. Nye, Piece in
Parts, p. 86.
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first sector of the regional economy to be integrated. It was followed
by the sector integration of the nuclear industry within Euratom and
then the EEC. a more general organization forming a ~egional common
market in Europe. While political integration did not progress as
rapidly as originally thought by the founders of nec-functionalist
theory, the economic organizations in Europe do have the greatest
potential for finally integrating the region. The neo-functiona1ist
approach has also been used in the study of other regional organizations
and has been able to identify the reasons why the~e has been success or
failure in such organizations as the LAFTA,43 CACM,44 and the EACM. 45
Theory ~nd Northwestern Europe
Aspects of both neo-functionalism and communications theory have
applicability to the study area of Northwestern Europe. The structural
conditions necessary for regional integration will be shown in the
analysis of the development of regionalism in Northwestern Europe. Both
the equality of the economic units and their pluralistic nature will be
demonstrated, as will complementary values and the region's ability to
adapt and respond to change. When considering the ultimate effect that
43Ernst B. Haas and Philipe Schmi tt.er, "Economic and Differential
Pattern of Political Integration: Projections About Unity in Latin
America." International Organization 18 (AutUDlll 1967): 259-299.
44J • S• Nye, "Central American Regional Integration, n International
Conciliation, No. 522 (March 1969).
4SJ . S• Nye, Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration,tI
International Organization 14 (Autumn 1965): 830-840.
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offahore oil and gas exploitation will have on regionalism these con-
cepts will also be used as will communications theory. It should be
noted that the attributes of "compatibility of major values" and
"mutual respcnsiveness" are very similar to the structural supports of
integ~ation in neo-functionalism and will be used interchangeably.
Finally, the regional infra-structure that has been developed in NOIth-
western Europe through the economic and other regional organizations
will be examined to see if these structures will maintain a focus on
regionalism in Northwestern Europe.
Chapter 4
REGIONALISM IN NQRTffiJESTERN EUROPE
Twice in this century Europe has been torn by war. After the first
world war, no basis for good relations between the countries was estab-
lished and the second war was a cataclysmic inevitab~lity. In the
years since World War II, however, a foundation was laid whereby peace-
ful and friendly relations among the countries of Northwestern Europe
CQuld be maintained. In essence, the rise of regionalism in Northwestern
Europe is derived from a positive reaction following the destruction by
war and the stark necessity for rebuilding a strong and united Europe.
While there is no absolute measure for the amount of cohesion that
exists in this region, it does manifest itself in a variety of easily
discernible ways. Nor is regionalism stagnant; it shifts constantly in
response to both internal and external pressures and events. It should
be stated, though, that countries which gain some success work~ng
together will tend to continue this cooperative effort based on
fami~iarity with and the ability to respond to each other's needs.
Background Conditions
In order for a firm and lasting basis of unity to be achieved on
a regional basis certain factors common to all countries concerned
should be present. This is not to say that one particular form of
government, social system or set of values is needed to achieve
regionalism. Nor will the presence of such similarities necessarily
result in the development of regional cohesion. However, the develop-
ment of a common unity and purpose is more easily achieved if there is
..
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a lack of suspicion over one's form of social life or economic system.
The fact of regionalism in Northwestern Europe is partially founded on
this idea.
Northwestern Europe 1s an area of relative political and cultural
homogeneity. All nine countri,es have representative political institu-
tions based on constitutionalism and "rule of law." Five countries are
constitutional monarchies with a parliament, and four are republics with
a combined presidential-parliamentary $ystem. All are pluralistic ,with
interest groups and numerous political parties. 46
Culturally they are imbued with the western Judeo-Christian ethic.
They are all urban-industrial societies; all of the countries are con-
tinuing their emphasis on industJialization, and only two countries,
Norway and Ireland, have less than 50% urbani~ation. All of the countries
are also welfare-states with concern for social services. Finally,
wh~le there are some differences betweeQstate economic control and
private control, all of Northwestern Europe is involved with, and
emphasizes international trade.
These background factors allow for an easier flow of information
and lessen suspicion by promoting the transfer of knowledge on how each
country's internal processes work. This political and cultural homo-
geneity encourages the development of shared major values and encourages
the increased responsiveness among the individual countries. While
these background conditions are not necessarily the most important
46Within neo-functionalist theory pluralism is one of the im~ortant
structural conditions necessary for integration.
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aspects in the development of regionalism in Northwestern Europe since
World War II, they are constant reinforcing factots in its continuation.
These underlying elements of regionalism have been particularly helpful
in the development and history of organizational interrelationships in
Northwestern Europe.
Co-operation Since World War ~
After the Second World War. Northwestern Europe was a shattered and
broken ruin. To rise above this desolation and rebuild a stronger
Europe many of the states began to join together in a variety of organi-
zatio~s to achieve solutions to common problems. The first inter-
governmental organization in Europe was negotiated before the war ended.
The customs union of Benelux. composed of Belgium, Luxembourg. and the
Netherlands, reached agreement on economic cooperation in 1944 and came
into existence in January 1948. This first achievement ~n multi-lateral
cooperation became the model for other advances in European economic
cohesion and signaled the start for active regional consultations on
economic and security problems.
The next inter-governmental organdzation created in post-war
Europe was the Brussels Pact of 1948. in which Britain, France, Belgium,
the Netherlands. and Luxembourg each a~reed to come to the aid of any
of the others in the event of military attack. 47 In 1954 Italy and
Germany joined the group and its name was changed to the Western European
Un~on (WEU). In 1949, however, the defense aspects of the alliance
47Roger Broad and Robert Jarret. Community Europe, (London:
~ald Wolfe, 1948), p. 20.
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were superceded by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO
was the product of the Cold War and extended across the Atlantic to 1n-
elude the United States and Canada.
In 1948 the original signatories of the Brussels Pact decided that
cooperation was also needed in the realm of the social and economic
spheres. They encouraged the creation of a European assembly which
could facilitate such cooperation. In 1949 the Council of Europe was
established with ten members. 48
Also in 1948, in response to the Marshall Plan, the Organization
for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established to aid in
coordinating economic recovery. In 1961 this organization was succeeded
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OEeD).
The vision in founding the Council of Europe and the OEEC was to
create some federal structure whereby integration of the European
countries would be achieved. However, no instt~utions were created for
this task and emphasis was placed on non-binding cooperation, not on
integration. On the other hand~ this lack of integrative ability
spurred the search for other inter-~overnmentalunions and led to the
establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In 1951
the ECSC was established with West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Luzembourg, France, and Italy as members. The British were invited to
attend but declined the offer. The purpose of this organization was to
integrate the coal and steel sectors of the members' economies.
48Eight additional members have been added to the Council of
Europe since that time.
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Associated with the establishment of the ECSC a plan for a
European Defense Community (EDC) was signed in 1952. In addition to
the ,original six, Britain was also supposed to be a member, but refused
to participate at the last moment. After the EDC. created to form a
European Army. a European Politi~a~ Community (EPC) was also to be
created to conduct a common foreign policy. However. for politica~
reasons. the EDC was not ratified and the EPC foundered as a result.
With the failure of the EDC, the Europeans returned their attention
to the economic sphere where they had gained most of their success.
Seeing the sector by sector approach as the best means to achieve
integration, a committee turned to the idea of creating a common
structure for the control and deyelopment of nuclear energy.49 Then a
plan fo~ the complete merger of the economies of the members of the ECSC
was proposed. The Treaty of Rome was signed on March 25. 1957. and on
January I. 1959. the EEC and Euratom came into being. Together with
the ECSC. these organizations which had the same membership were bound
together under the title, European Community. In response to this; the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was established by those countries
that were not asked to join the EEe. 50 The establishment of both the
EEC and the EFTA set up two opposing economic organizations in Europe;
the former with the intent of merging the economies of the member
count~ies and having a common external tariff. and the latter with no
49Broad and Jarret, p. 22.
SaThe EFTA members were Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal.
Sweden, and Switzerland.
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common external tariffs but free trade among the members. The question
of external tariffs was central in the establishment of two economic
organizations in Europe. The EFTA did not want them while the EEe did.
In the early Sixties the EFTA made attempts to come to terms with
the EEC in order to create a single European market. The EEC, on the
other hand, was reluctant to establish closer arrangements fearing that
such accommodation would weaken the EEC and hurt the benefits already
achieved. During the Sixties it became evident to several members of
the EFTA that stronger links between the two organizations would not be
forthcoming. and this situation could have serious divisive consequences
for regional relations. 51 As a result, Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and
Norway applied for full membersh~p in the EEC and some preliminary
negotiations were made on their applications. Unfortunately. and to
the detriment of regional relations, the negotiations were broken off
at the request of the French.
After the rejection in 1963, British interest in the EEC increas~d.
Both trade and investment with the continent were increasing rapidly
and world events showed the need for further regional contacts. In
1966. the British government announced tts intention to reapply for
entry into the EEC. Norway, Ireland, and Denmark followed the British
lead and many of the other EFTA members applied for associate status.
However. the French ~g~i~ voiced their opposition to enlarging the
Community and the membership applications were deferred.
51Creat Britdin, British Information Services, British Membership
of the European Community, (London: Central Office of Information,
January 1973, R5940/73), p. 10.
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With the change in government 1n France in 1969, the French attitude
to an enlarged EEC also changed and, as a result, in 1971 meaningful
negotiations on the new members ensued. In 1973 the new Community of
nine was forrr.ed without Norway which refused admittance. It created a
large economic unit whose combined industrial power was greater than any
other unit in the world. The enlarged Community also created a situa-
tion where increased regional cohesion was institutionalized by an infra-
structure that permeated Northwestern Europe.
Moreover, this increased unity did not exclude other West European
states. The remaining members of the EFTA initiated negotiations so
that a European market could be established through the reduction of
tariffs.
The spirit and power of regionalism can be shown by Norway's rela-
tions with the EEC. Norway rejected the offer of membership in the
European Community because; 1) there was disa~reement with the
principles of the Community's general policy; 2) There were fears over
Norway losin~ its sovereignty; and 3) Disagreement surfaced over agri-
cultural and fishing negotiations. 52 Despite these problems, however,
Norway opened negotiations with the EEC in 1973 to formulate a trade
policy which would gradually abolish tariffs on industrial goods. The
result is that Norway, even though it is not a member of the Et.C, will
have closer ties with the Community formalized by treaty, a fact most
bene~icial to the maintenance of regionalism in Northwestern Europe.
52Norway, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway and
!h! EC, (UD~ 087/74), p. 3.
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The economic sphere is not the only area where a base level of
regiqnalism has been created. The rea~ of regional defense has also
fostered communication and closer ties within the area. The main
vehicle for this has been the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
While not purely European in character, NATO has, for the most part.
succeeded in inc~easing regional relations.
NATO is a military alliance that is highly integrated having a
distinct division of responsibility filtering down from the North
Atlantic Council and the Secretary-General of NATO. It has no supra-
national characteristics and all major policies must be unanimously
agreed upon by the member countries. It has little direct decision-
making authority and serves more as a ratifier of policies advanced
by its members. NATO was formed in 1949 for the express purpose of
the military security of its members and the direction of common
pOlicies toward particular external enemies. In the original forma-
tion of NATO the Soviet Union was seen as the greatest potential threat
to the organization's security.
As the immediate Soviet threat subsided and world attention moved
to co-existence between the superpowers NATO served, at one time or
another, as a mean~ for fostering European integration and for developing
an Atlantic community. In fact. NATO has been touted as being the
cornerstone fo'r the evolution of the Eurepean organizational system.
During the twenty-six years of its existence NATO has been a very
active organization but its principal policy functions are more
consultative than creative, more c~unicative than innovative, and
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tended to be mo~e peripheral than central to the diverse concerns of
53the members. However, this lack of definitive policy-making power
is not totally detrimental. The structure of the alliance has pro-
meted a hi~h degree of contact between the members and has allowed
for communication and responsiveness to be developed thro~hout Europe.
The fact that NATO is one forum where all of Northwestern Europe can
meet and exchange views on one important regional question, defense,
ensures the ability of the re~lon to retain contacts that will lead
Northwestern Europe to heightened regionalism.
The role that NATO has played in Europe has been neither smooth
nor steady. Serious questions have been raised over the viability
that NATO has today and the actions of some of its members unlerscore
the need to revitalize its regional functions. Interestingly enough,
this question of its continuing role as a regional institution helps
cohesion because it keeps communications circulatin~ throughout the
area. For the time being, then, NATO, along with the other organiza-
tional structures in Northwestern Europe, will serve to sustain
regionalism in the area.
Further Regional Factors
The growth of inter-governmental organizations in Northwestern
Europe are an important indicator of regionalism in the area. This
participation is not only regional, but is also with the whole world
community. In terms of participation in intergovernmental organizations
53Edw1n H. Fedder, NATO: The Dynamics of Alliance in the Postwar
World. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1973), p. 88.
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the top four in the world are France, the United Kingdom, Belgium,
and West Ger~ny. Eight of the nine countries in Northwestern Europe
54
are in the top thirteen. The only country not in this top group is
Ireland. However, these rankings do not reflect the fact that Ireland
is now a member of the EEC and could, as a result, rise in the rankings.
Regionally, there are fourteen inter-governmental organizations (see
Table 1) in Northwestern Europe and all the countries are heavily
represented. Belgium is the leader with membership in thirteen of the
fourteen groups and Norway and Ireland are the l~est, belonging to
nine organizations. Finally regional organizational membership is not
limited to the government level. There are 272 non-governmental groups
aS30ciated with the EEC. 55 Contact thus permeates throughout the
political and economic structure of Northwestern Europe.
Another important manifestation of regionalism is the economic
interdependence of Northwestern Europe (see Tables 2 and 3). In terms
of both imports and exports, a large percentage of the trade is intra-
regio~al. Intra-regional trade as a percentage of total foreign trade
is lowest in the United Kingdom with 32% imports and 31% exports.
The Netherlands leads with 68% of their exports being within the
region. Only Norway and the United Kingdom have their largest trade
volume with a country outside Northwestern Europe. In fact the
541972 Yearbook of International Organizations, Table 12.
55Ibid, pp. 730-732.
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TABLE 1
MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS
Council
ECACl OECD2 ECMTJ CCC4
of
CERN6Europe NAT05
Belgium X X X X X X X
Denmark X X X X X X X
Fed. Rep.
Germany X X X X X X X
France X X X X X X X
Ireland X X X X X
Luxembourg X X X X X X X
Netherlands X X X X X X X
Norway X X X X X X X
United
Kingdom X X X X X X X
lECAC European Ciyil Aviation Conference
20ECD Organizatio. for Economic Cooperation and Development
3ECMT European Conference of Ministers of Transport
4CCC Customs Cooperation Council
5NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
6CERN European Council for Nuclear Research
Source: Updated from Table 14, Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of
International Relation, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1968.
TABLE l--Continued
MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS
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WEU7 ECSC8 9 EURATCM10
Rhine Nordic
BENELUX11EEC Connn. Council
Belgium X X X X X X X
Denmark X X X X
Fed. Rep.
Germany X X X X X
France X X. X X X
Ire.land X X X
Illxembourg X X X X X X
Netherlands X X X X X X
Norway X
United
Kingdom X X X X X
7WEU Western European Union
8ECSC European Coal and St,eel Cotnmunity
9EEC European Economic Community
lOEURATOM European Atomic Energy Community
llBENELUX Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg
TABlE 2
LEADING TRADE PARTNERS
(Ranked in Terms of Total Foreign Trade)
Be18ium- Fed. Rep. United
Luxembourg Denmark Germany France Ireland Nether lands Norway Ki3dom
Import..~ 1 FRG FRG Neth. FRG UK FRG Sweden USA
2 France Sweden France Ben-1m: FRG Bel-Lux FRG FRG
3 Neth. UK Bel-Lux Italy USA USA UK France
Exports I FRG UK France FRG UK FRG UK USA
2 France Sweden Neth. Italy USA Bel-Lux Sweden FRG
3 Neth. FRG Italy Ben-Lux FRG France FRG F,rance
Source: CECD, Foreign Trade Statistics, Series A, Overall Trade By Country, September 1974.
~
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TABLE 3
CHANGES IN TRADE RELATIONS
BETWEEN 1964-1973
(ChanRes in Intra-regional Trade as %of Total Foreign Trade)
Belgium- Fed. Rep. United
Luxembourg Denmark Germany France Ireland Netherlands Norway Kingdom
Imports 1964 58% 55% 36% 38% 66% 58% 46% 22%
1973 67 48 44 46 70 57 44 32
change +9 -7 +8 +8 +4 -1 -2 +10
Exports 1964 66% 53% 39% 38% 82% 64% 50% 27%
1973 69 48 40 115 74 68 45 31
change +3 -5 +1 +7 -8 +4 -5 +4
Source: OECD. Foreign Trade Statistics. Series A. Overall Trade By Country. September 1974.
~
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United States is the only major trade partner of these countries that
is not in Western Europe. 56
The level of regionalism that does exist in Northwestern Europe
has arrived after a great deal of effort. Further efforts in coopera-
tion and a further rise in regional consc~ousness will, however,
involve more sacrifices of national interest for the regional good.
Much of the e~i~ting level of regionalism, while it has not come
easily, has occurred because shared benefits have accrued to all, and
very little had to be sacrificed. For regionalism to increase, the
countries of Northwestern Europe must be responsive to each other's
needs, and must be wi~ling to relinquish some narrow national policies
for the benefit of the whole region. The oil and gas resources in the
North Sea are an important are& where the needs and interests of
different countries must be reconciled before further cohesion will
~esult.
56The heavy re,liance of Northwesttern Europe on Intr~-reglonal
trade shows the basic economic equality of· the members. An important
structural condition for integration tn neo-functionalist theory.
Chapter 5
REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE NORTH SEA
With the exploration for and the e~lcitation of oil and gas in
the North Sea increasing at a feverish rate, the littoral countries
of the North Sea have ach~eved some measure of progress in international
co-operation. In the realm of continental shelf boundary delimitation,
bringing resources to shore, and pollution agreements, progress has
been made and it has benefited many of the countries in Northwestern
Europe. This co-operation has faci~itated some rise in regionalism by
increasing the countries' abilities to find solutions to problems coh-
fronting all of them. ·Unfortuna:ely, this co-operation has not led as
yet to any concrete measures for a regional approach to offshore oil
and gas production. Each country is following its own path and pre-
cepts toward efficient exploitation of its own resources. Despite
this fact, the co-operation to date is an important first step toward
achieving some regional concensus on the direction that exploitation
should take. The less divisive problems that face a region must be
solved before negotiations on other, more difficult, aspects can ensue.
Boundary Delimitation
The first. and most important. step in any co-operative effort on
oil and gas exploitation would appear to be the delimitation of con-
tinental shelf boundaries between the countries involved (see map 2).
In o%:der to avoid any disputes over who a,ctually owns the oil. a.gree-
.ent must be made on an equitable apportionment of the continental
shelf, based on international law. The importance of this delimitation
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and the acrimonious disputes that can result are shown by the fact that
in only two semi-enclosed seas in the world have the interested states
agreed on common shelf boundaries. The North Sea 1s one of the areas. 57
As stated earlier in this paper the Continental Shelf Convention
gives authority to the coastal state to control exclusive rights for
exPloring and exploiting natural resources adjacent to its coast to
a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
8uperadjacent waters admi.ts to the exploitation of the natural resou~ces
58
of the area. In areas of the world where opposite or adjacent states
have the same continental shelf, the boundary was to be divided by
negotiation, or by a median line unless special circumstances were
involved. Article 6 says:59
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the
territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite
each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertain-
ing to such States shall be determined by agreement between
them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary
line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is
the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the
nearest points of the baseline from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of each State is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the
territories of two adjacent States, the boundary of the con-
tinental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them.
In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line
is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be
deter.mined by application of the principle of equidistance
from the nearest points of the baseline from which the breadth
of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
57The Persian Gulf being the other area where agreement has been
reached on most of the boundaries.
58United Nations, Convention ~~ Continental Shelf, Article 2.
S9Ibid • Article 6.
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The countries in the North Sea that have ratified or are bound
by this convention and to whom Article 6 applies are the United Kingdom,
Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and France with reservations. All
the boundaries have been agreed upon with the exception of those of
Belgium and of France.
Both France and Belgium have reasons for not formalizing their
continental shelf boundaries. Belgium has a dispute with the Nether-
lands over who owns a coastal channel and until this problem is legally
solved, no continental shelf boundaries can be established. The
primary problem with the French boundary is the position that the
Chann~l Islands will play in the boundary delimitation. The French
have conceded that the Channel I~lands should be administered by the
British but refuse to have a median line drawn based on the position
of these islands. France feels that a boundary drawn on this basis
would give a disproportionate share of the shelf to the British. How-
ever, there are no active disputes over the boundaries of either France
or Belgium and no serious problems are extant in the North Sea from
this lack of agreement.
The first major boundary agreement was between the United Kingdom
and Norway. The success of this agreement was particularly important
when considering the geological structure called the Norwegian Trench.
This Trench is much de.eper than the 200 metres allowed for in the
Shelf Convention and could have been construed by the British as the
end of the Norwegian shelf. However t the decision was made to delimit
the boundary or. a straight median line basis and this resolved what
could have been a serious dispute. The importance of this treaty was
emphasized when the first major oil field was found in the Norwegian
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sector of the continental shelf but on the British side of the Trench.
In a similar manner the United Kingdom made boundary agreements with
the ~etherlands and Denmark. Furthermore, median line boundaries were
established between Norway and Denmark and between Denmark and the
Netherlands. Agreements were also made between the Federal Republic
of Germany and both Denmark and the Netherlands on the boundaries
immediately adjacent to the coastal areas. However. no solution could
be reached on the continental shelf boundaries and, by common consent,
the countries submitted their grievance to the International Court of
Justice for judicial decree.
The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
In 1967 Denmark, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of
Germany asked the Court to decide the question of what principles and
rules of international law are applicable to the delimitation of the
continental shelf between the parti,es involved. 60 On behalf of the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany it was submitted that
the equidistance method for delimiting boundaries is Dot a rule of
customary international law and therefore is not applicable as such
between the parties. 6l The submission goes on to say that the equi-
distance method cannot find applicability because it does not apportion
62
a just and equitable share to the Federal Republic of Germany. aoth
60International Court of Justice, 1969 North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, Judgment Ei ~O February 19~The Hague, p. 7.
61Ibid 8 i 1 2, p. , art c e •
62Ibid , p. 8, article 4.
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tne Netherlands and Denmark in their reply, state that article 6
paragraph 2 of the Continental Shelf Convention is a rule of inter-
national law and delimitation of the shelf in the North Sea is
governed by it, and that since special circumstances have not been
e8~ablished the boundary shou~d be based on the equidistance
principle. 63
In the judgment handed down by the International Court of Justice
on February 20, 1969, the plea by Denmark and the Netherlands was re-
jected. 64The majority opinion in each case was:
(A) The use of the equidistance method of delimitation
not being obligatory as between the Parties; and
(B) There being no other single method of delimitation
the use of which is in all circumstances obligat~ry;
(e) The principles and rule'~ Ctf international law applic-
able to the delimitation as between the Part!es of the
areas of the continental shelf in the North Sea which
appertain to each of them beyond the partial boundary
determined by the agreement of 1 December 1964 and 9
June 1965, repsectively, are as follows:
(1) delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accord-
ance with equitable principles, and taking account Ei all
the releva~t circumstances, in such a way as to leave
as-much ~s possible to each party all those parts of the
continental shelf that constitute ~ natural prolongation
of its land territory into and under the sea, without
encroachment on the natural prolongation 2t the land
territory of the other. (Italics added)
(2) if, in the application of the preceding sub-paragraph,
the delimitation leaves to the Parties areas that overlap,
these are to be divided between them in agreed proportions
or, failing agreement, equally, unless they decide on a
regime of joint juriBdiction, user or exploitation for the
zones of overlap or any parts of them;
(D) In the course of the negotiations, the factors to be
taken into account are to include:
63Ibid , pp. 11-12.
64Ibid , pp. 54-55.
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(1) The general configuration of the coasts of the
Parties, as well as the presence of any special or un-
usual fea tures;
(2) so far as known or readily ascertainable, the physical
or geological structure, and natural resources, of the
continental shelf areas involved;
(3) the element of a reasonable degre€\ of proportionality.
which a delimitation carried out in accordance with equi-
table principles ought to bring about between the extent
of the continental shelf are apper~aining to the coastal
State and the length of its coast measured in the general
direction of the coastline. account being taken for this
purpose of the effects, actual or prospective, of any
other continental shelf delimitation between adjacent
States in the same region.
The Court also stated that the parties are under an obligatio~ 50 to
conduct themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which will
not be the case when either of them insist upon its own position
without any modification of that position. 65 As a result of this
judgment the parties negotiated their shelf boundaries and signed
agreements in 1971. The boundaries were based partially on equi-
distance and partially on negotiated points. New treaties were then
signed by all these countries wiLh the United Kingdom in light of
their own agreements.
The significance of the North Sea Cases was threefold: first, it
reject~d the equidistance principle as a rule of customary inter-
national law which means thatal1 international sea boundaries between
adjacent states will be decided by ne~otiation and not on equidistance,
unless both parties agree to that principle. Second, it reinforces
the reg~onalism of North~estern Europe by demonstratLng ~hat the
countries a~e interested in a peaceful resolution of their conflicts
65Ibid. p. 48.
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based on law and equity. Finally, the judgment took into consideration
the fact of subsea resources that may cross shelf boundaries and dis-
cusaed the idea of "uniey of deposits."
:The Concept £i "Unitization". in SlJbse:a Resources
In paragraph 97 of the ICJ judgment on the North Sea Continental
Shelf Casea it was stated that, "Another factor to be taken into
consideration in the delimitation of areas of continental shelf as
between adjacent States is the unity of any deposits. 66 In reference
to hydrocarbon deposits this factor is very important. the geological
structure is such that the fields could be wastefully exploited on
either side of the boundary line and one or more states could be
deprived of the eventual benefits. In the treaty agreed upon by the
Federal Republic of Germany with both Denmark and t~e Netherlands an
article was added to achieve solutions to this potential problem. In
many of the other treaties on boundary delimitation in the North Sea
the parties also addressed themselves to the eventuality of resources
crossing the boundaries.
In the shelf agreement with both Norway and Denmark the United
Kingdom allowed for the possibility of shared petroleum fields and
made provisions for reaching agreement on the apportionment of the pro-
ceeds derived. Article 4 of the United Kingdom-Norway treaty typifies
66Ibid, p. 52.
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67the arrangements made. It states:
If any single geological petroleum structure or petroleum
field, or any single geological structure or field of any
other mineral deposit including sand or gravel, extends
across the dividing line and the part of such structure
or field which is situated on one side of the dividing
line is exploitable, wholly or in part, from the other
side of the dividing line, the Contracting parties shall
seek to reach agree.ment as to the exploitation of such.
structure or field.
The major problem with this type of agreement is that it does
not set up any concrete method by which any dispute can be rectified.
This is shown by the fact that Norway and the United Kingdom are having
problems over the Frigg gas field68 and other fields that cross
national seabed boundaries.
The agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and both
the Netherlands and Deamark are better because they provide for
arbitration in case of dispute. However, some writers have noted
several problems associated with the ·agreement. 69 Articles 2 of both
treaties are very similar. Article 2 of the treaty between the Federal
Republic of Germany and Denmark states in part: 70
67 International Boundary Study, Series A, Limits in the Seas,
No. 10, "North Sea Continental Shelf Boundaries." (Washington: De-
partment of State, Office of the Geographer), p. 4.
68The principle area of dispute between Norway and Britain is
compensation for the Norwegian concessionaire who is five years behind
the British in drilling.
69For a discussion on some of the problems with resources that
cross seabed bo'undaries, see L. F. E. Goldie, tiThe North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases: A Postscript," New York Law Forum XVII (FaLl 1973),
pp. 415-17.
70Ibid • Appendix I, p. 424.
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(1) Should mineral resources be discovered on the contin-
ental shelf of either contracting party and should the
other contracting party consider that the deposit thus
discovered extend to its own continental shelf, it may
put forward its view to other contracting party, together
with the supporting data. If that other Contracting
party does not share this view, the arbitral tribunal
provided for under Article 5 of the present Treaty shall
find on this question at the request of either Contracting
party.
(2) Should the Contracting Parties agree or should the
arbitral tribunal have found that the deposit is located
on the continental shelf of both Contracting Parties, the
Governments of the Contracting Parties shall reach agree-
ment as to its exploitation, taking into account the
interests oj both Contracting Farties on the principle
that each Contracting Party is entitled to the mineral
resources located on its continental shelf. In the event
that mineral resources have already been extracted from
the field which crosses the dividing line, the agreement
should contain provisions regarding adequate compensation.
There are three problems with this agreement. First, it does
not call upon the parties involved to bargain in good faith; second,
no eXpress provision for conciliation prior to arbitration is provided;71
and finally, while it does provide for compensation to the aggrieved
party, it does not call for a just apportionment of both the costs and
the proceeds from exploiting the resources. This provision is, how-
ever, included in the treaty on "Single Geological Structures" between
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands which is probably the most
enlightened agreement in Northwestern Europe on resources that cross
national shelf boundaries.
The agreement on "Single Geological Structures Extending Across
the Dividing Line on the Continental Shelf Under the North Sea" could
71Ibid, p. 417.
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be a model for other agreements on the North Sea. Approved as a
second treaty in addition to the treaty dividing the continental
shelf between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, it provides
an objective and necessary so!utio,n to this most pressing problem.
72Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty state:
(1) If any single geological mineral oil or natural gas
structure or field extends across the dividing line
and the part of such structure or fieLd which is situ~
ated on either side of the dividing line is exploi~able,
wholly or in part, from the other side of the dividing
line, the Contracting Parties will seek to reach agree-
ment as to the manner in which the structure or field
shall be most effectively expl0ited and the manner in
which the costs and proceeds relating thereto shall be
apportioned. after having invited the licensees concerned,
if any, to submit agreed proposals to this effect.
(2) When a structure or field referred to 1n Article 1
of this agreement is such that failure to reach agree-
ment between the Contracting Parties would prevent
maximum ultimate recovery of the deposit or lead to
unnecessary competitive drilling, then any question
upon which the Contracting Parties are unable to agree
concerning the manner in which the costs anrl proceeds
relating thereto shall be apportioned, shall, at the
request of either Contracting Party, be referred to a
single Arbitrator to be jointly appointed by the Con-
tracting Parties. The decision of the Arbitrator shall
be binding upon the Contracting Parties.
these guidelines, while not perfect, will allow for a more efficient
exploitation of any hydrocarbons found in common. It also shows that
72
"Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and the Government of the Kingdo~ of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland Relating to the Exploitation of Single Geological
Structures Extending Across the Dividing Line on the Continental Shelf
Under t~e North Sea," in National Legislation and Treaties Relating ~
the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Continental Shelf, the
High Sea, and to"Fishin'g and Conserv~n of the Livi_ng Resources £!.
the ~ea, United Nations: New York, 1970, (ST/LEG./Ser. B/lS). p. 778.
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one state could act as the "agent,,73 for all the countries involved
with costs and benefits being equitably apportioned. Unfortunately,
the Treaty has never been tested.
The boundary delimitation in the North Sea is a classic case of
int·ernational co-operation and will serve to heighten regionalism in
Northwestern Europe. The spirit of commu~ity throughout this
endeavor is shown by the fact that Denmark has retained some attractive
drilling areas in what is now the German S~ctor of the Continental
shelf. 74 Moreover, companies which were granted licenses in areas
that were claimed by the Netherlands and then awarded to Germany were
given the opportunity to reapply for rights under German jurisdiction. 75
While many problems over the boundaries could appear in the future, to
date the efforts on this front have fairly successful in increasing
regionalism in Northwestern Europe.
North ~ea Pollution and Resource Agree~ents
The only multi-lateral agreement in the North Sea, other than
fisheries, which involves all the littoral states is an agreement on
pollution. The signatories of the "Agreement for Cooperation in
73The concept of the "agent" state in petroleum production is
discussed in L.F.E. Goldie, "The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases:
A Ray ·of Hope for the International Court;" New York Law Forum 16
(Fall 1970): 370-375. - -- --
74Go1die, "The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases: A Post-script. II
p. 415.
75Robert E. King. "Petroleum Production in Europe 1n 1973,"
p. 1986.
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Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by 011,,76 are NorwaYt Denmark,
the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany. Belgium, France, the
United Kingdom, and Sweden. The Treaty came into force in 1969. The
agreement provides for all the participating countries, within their
awn zones, to be responsible for detection of pollution and to notify
the concerned members if the oil were to move into the other members'
zones. This Treaty was a step towards the development of a compre-
hensive pollution policy. What needs to be developed next is a
regional program for minimum pollution standards t with enforcement
and penalties binding on all members.
Another area in which cooperative efforts in the North Sea are
pr·mounced is in bringing exploited resources to shore.
In terms of getting its resources to shore, the most disadvantaged
country in the North Sea is Norway. Because of the Norwegian Trench
there is no continuous continental shelf upon which to lay a pipeline.
Since virtually all oil and gas resources found to date are on the
shelf areas away from Norway the promlem extant takes on increased
signifi,cance. With the fact that pipelines fr01Il the 011 fields directly
to Norway are not technologically feasible the only means of getting
the resources to shore is by tanker. However, this method is slow and
inefficient due to the necessity of having an expensive storage
capacity for oil on the continental shelf, and because disruption of
tanker loadings can result from sustained bad weather. The r,esult
76United Nations, "Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with
Pollution of the North Sea by Oil." in National Legislation and
Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea. (ST!LEG/SER.B/16). pp. 435-
438.
-.
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of this dilemma has been the decision of Norway to send its reSOurces
to other North Sea countries by pipeline, a decision aided by the
co-operation of the United Kingdom and· the Federal Republic of
Germany.
On April 7, 1972, a committee was appointed by Royal Decree in
Norway to clarify the conditions for landing petroleum in the United
k±ngdom. Later this committee was also requested to take up negotia-
tion with the Federal Republic of Germany on the same subject. 7?
The points of particular interest were: which state had control over
taxation of capital and income, which state's laws had applicability
to the pipeline, and whether there would be any obstacle to the re-
turning of petroleum to Norway.78
In the negotiations among the three countries the following points
were agreed upon: 1) Pipeline companies which own OT operate pipe-
lines shall be registered in Norway. 2) Norwegian safety regulations
and pollution liability rules will apply. 3} The transport tariff
for Norwegian produced petroleum will be subject to approval by Norway.
4) Connection of pipelines from other fields is subject to Norwegian
approval and Norwegian oil will have first priority. 5) Norway will
tax the pipeline over its entire length. 79 In addition West Germany
77Norway, Ministry of Industry and Crafts, Report No. 51 to the
·.Norwegian Sorting, (1972-73), "'Landing of Petroleum fromtheEcofish
Area,rt March 2, 1973, p. 29.
781bid, p. 29.
79Ibid, pp. 29-30.
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agreed that Norway could tax 1) installations connected ro the pipe-
line on the Continental Shelf such as monitoring and compressor
stations, and 2) installations at the landing ~oint used. to measure,
store, and stabilize the transported product or where NGL is separated
from the crude oil. Processes such as refining are not included in
80this agreement. -
The United Kingdom initially agreed to substantially the same tax
arrangement as West Germany except to the taxing of facilities used
to separate the NGL frQm the crude oil. 8l This roadblock has been
rectified, however, and an oil pipeline to the United Kingdom is
scheduled for completion in early 1975. A gas pipeline to West Germany
wi.ll be completed a few years lacer. This spirit of international co-
operation, as in all the other co-operative efforts mentioned, has
aided all the countries participating in the endeavor and has allo~ed
the process of regionalization to continue in Northwestern Europe.
Further Centripetal Factors in~ North Sea
-While not directly associated with oil and gas exploitation other
activites in the sea, particularly oceanographic research and fisheries,
promote co-op~ration among the countries of Northwestern Europe.
These communal efforts can create a spillover effect into ,those aspects
of regional relations concerned with the offshore oil and gas enter-
prise and help to develop regional cohesion on this important front.
80Ibid , p. 30.
81Ibid , p. 30.
'"- --,-----------~-----~
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One of the most visible areas where regional cooperation and
policies are apparent is in fisheries. All of Northwest~rn Europe
has fishing interests in the North Sea and the countries have come
together On several occasions to participate in regional organizations
designed to regulate fisheries. Principally, these agreements recog-
nize the depletion of fish resources as a major problew in the area,
and thus the members of the region sign multi-lateral agreements
under which the signatory powers accept equal restriction on their
fishery· efforts. 82
The first regulat'ory commission that was es,tablished, the Permanent
Commission, was primarily concerned with the regulation of the mesh of
fishing nets and the size limit!, of fish. 83 The major problem of the
Commission, howeve~, was its inability to transfer tts authority to
other areas of fishery regulations.
Due to this problem the Commission was Te-organized in 1963 into
the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC). This new
commission was designed to promote the conservation of fishery stocks
throughout its member territories and to provide for international
inspection of regulation enforcement. These commissions were not
scientific bodies and got their information from the International
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES).84 However, since the
82A1exander, Offshore Geography ~Northwestern Europe, p. 97.
83C•E• Lucas, International Fishery Bodies of the North Atlantic,
Law of the Sea Institute Occasional Paper No. 5,(Kingst,on: University
of Rhode Island, 1970). p. 14.
84For a discussion on the ICES, see p. 61.
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function of the NEAFC is regulatory, it encourages communication and
regional cooperation through the development of common policies for
the conservatLon of fishery resources.
These attempts at harmonizing fishery policies in Northwestern
Europe have also been promoted through the actions of the EEC. In the
process of uniting the Community members economically, the EEC has
developed common fishery policies for its members. While there were
some problems in deciding on the type of policy which should be
developed, the Council of Ministers finally adopted several regulations
which would establish a common structure for the fishing sector and a
common market for fish products. Both came into effect on February 1,
1971. 85 Central to this plan wa3 equal access to all fishing waters
of the members which were formerly off limits. In some cases the
~embers were allowed to keep three miles exclusively for their use for
up to five years, but after that period all waters would be open for
fishing. When the three new members were admitted into the EEC they
also came under this regulation. In their case, however, they were
allowed to protect a six mile fisheries limit for a ten year transitional
period. These efforts by the EEC in coordinating national fishery
policy and bringing it under a regional orientation has proved to be a
significant aspect of regionalism in the North Sea.
the area of oceanographic research has also proved to be a unifying
force in Northwestern Europe. The International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea (ICES) is a regional organization which promotes
85Janis , pp. 280-281.
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cooperation on scientific research, particularly on living resourc.es.
among its member countries. In the study of fishery stocks and
currents. as well as in many other aspects of oceanographic research.
they investigate marine phenomena for the benefit of its members. The
information thus acquired through the ICES promotes regional cohesion
because all the states of Northwestern Europe have a vested interest
in coop~rating to get this valuable information. The work of the ICES
led to the treaties for conservation of fishery resources in North-
western Europe by emphasizing the effect that intensive fishing has
on fishery stocks. Information acquired through the ICES on other
aspects of the North Sea could be used in pffshore oil and gas
exploitation.
Oceanographic research has also been promoted by NATO. NATO has
attempted to give further impetus to cooperati0n among member states
86by concentrating on studies on the marine environment and pollution.
The members have declared their intention to end the discharge of oil
waste into the sea and have moved to minimize accidental spills. 87
Furthermore, NATO also seeks to maintain freedom of navigation in the
seas and has promoted common policies on that aspect of ocean use.
So then, beside the cohesive aspect that NATO has a defense alliance,
it also promotes regionalism in Northwestern Europe by focusing communal
attention on a variety of non-military, sea-related activities.
86FriedheIm Kruger-Sprengal, The~ of NATO in the Use £i. the
Sea and the Seabed, (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, 1972), pp. 16-~7.
87 Ibid, p. 17.
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Finally, one pervasive economic element in the world today should
be mentioned as a centripetal force in Northwestern Europe. This
element is the role that a multi-national corporation plays in the
region. The multi-national corporation is a product of the developed
count~ies, principally the United States and Europe. It facilitates
the movement of goods acrosa national bou~daries and binds the region
in a common economic bond. In fact, these corporations have become
such important economic units that the wellbeing of the ·countries in
which they are incorporated is dependent on the corporate success of
these multi-national giants. Moreover, not only is the multi-national
corporation an important eleme~t in itself but it is also joining with
other large corporations into ccnsortia which will have the ability
to finance the expensive undertaking in the North Sea.
A perfect example of the inter-relationships that the multi-
national corporation develops among the states in the North Sea is
the activities of the Shell Group. Not only is this giant combine
made up of two companies, one in Britain and one in the Netherlands,
it also owns, directly or indirectly, companies involved in various
branches of the oil, natural gas, chemical, and ~etals business in
over 100 countries. SS On a regional scale it holds assets in all nine
countries of Northwestern Europ~ many of Which are involved with oil
and gas efforts in the North Sea. The Shell Group has major holdings
in the Norwegian, British, and Danish sectors of the North Sea and
88Jane,s Major Companies of Europe, 1974, (London: Sampson, Low,
Marston, & Co. LTD), p. F129.
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also works with other major multi-national corporations to finance
these fields.'
What is created 1s'a web of business and financial interests
which tie all of Northwestern Europe together. With international
business being the lifeblood of the region the inter-relationships
of these multi-national corporations exert a powerful unifying effect
in Northwestern Europe. They encourage the countries to develop
common policies which would be conducive for an efficient exploita-
tion of the sea and increase communication within the area on both a
corporate and national scale. The multi-national corporation, as
well as all the other centripetal forces in the North Sea, serve as
a promoter for regionalism in th~ area and encour~ges the inter-
dependence of all the countries in Northwestern Europe.
Chapter 6
CENTRIFUGAL FORCtS IN THE NORTH~
The co-operative efforts in the North Sea have been important
for the continuation of regionalization in Northwestern Europe. The
boundary delimit.ation, aa well as the pollution and resource agree-
ments t have allowed the littoral states of the North Sea to create
closer ties and mutual respect for each other. These results cannot
be minimized.
However, they are continually being threatened by divisive forces
in the area which could destroy all beneficial achievements to date.
,/
Conflict in the uses of the sea, variations in national la~s and
regulations, and the different national timetables for production and
conservation of resources can, alo~e or in concert~ create tensions
which could undermine regional cohesion. The maintenance of good
relations in Northwestern Europe and a promulgation of regionalism
will rest in the ability of the concerned parties to assess the
significance of the problems confronting them~ and obtain rapid and
equitable solutions for all.
Conflict in the Uses of the Sea
HistoricallYt the North Sea is an area of excellent fishing
potential and is heavily used for sea transport. Some of the world's
busiest ports have their access routes through the North Sea. Among
them are Antwerp, London, and Rotterdam (the busiest port in the world).
In 1971 t 45,961 sea going ships of 247.7 million gross tons entered
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the Netherland's ports alone. 89 About 300,000 ships a year pass
through the Strait of Dover. 90
Fishing is also very profitable, with an estimated annual catch
from the North Sea of 3.5 million tons. 91 With the advent of oil
and gas exploitation in the area, the newcomer has rivaled the other
uses of the sea for space and potential conflicts have appeared.
While conflicts in the sea could take aeveral forms, the one most
appropriate to oil and gas exploitation 1S "conflicts between
different uses of the same space.,,92 This idea emphasizes the
·physical fact that no ~o objects can occupy the same space at any
point i~ time. It is relevant to the discussion because the establish-
ment of drilling rigs in "recognized sea lanes" or in traditional
f~shing grounds could endanger the safety and profitability of these
enterprises. Not only are the rigs a possible danger, but pipelines
could also cause the loss of· nets or anchors for ships involved with
other sea occupations. At the moment there are no definite conflicts
89The Statesman's Yearbook 1973, p. 1182.
9~.W. Richey, "The Separation of Traffic at Sea," Journal of
the Institute £f Navigation 19 (October 1966): 412.
9lIn Table 1, from J.A. Gulland. ed., The Fish Resources of the
Oceans, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 9~Rome: Food ~nd Agri=--
culture Organization of the United Nations. 1970).
92William L. Griffin, "Accommodation of Conflicting Uses of
Ocean Space With S.pecial Reference to Navi~ation Safety Lanes," in
Proceedings of ~ Second Annual Conference E.f the Law of the Sea
Institute~ June.26-June 29. 1967, (Kingston R.I., 1968) p. -73. The
other two types of conflict are, nConflicts involVing the same transi-
tory use of the same space," and "Conflict between different uses of
different space."
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in the North Sea because oil and gas exploitation is still in the
early stages. As early as 1967, however, there had been over 50
cOLlisions between ships and oil installations in the Gulf of Mexico,93
a fact which could, in the long run, prove significant for North-
western Europe.
The relevant section concerned with subsea exploitation and other
uses of the sea is found in the Convention on the Continental Shelf.
Article 5(1) states: 94
The exploration of the continental shelf and the
exploitation of its natural resources must not result in
any unjustifiable interference vith navigation, fishing,
or the conservation of the living resources of the sea,
nor result in any interference with fundamental oceano-
graphic or other scientific research carried out with the
intent of open publication.
Article 5(2) also sets up safety zones around all installations used
for subsea exploration and production. All countries which have
ratified or acceded to this convention are supposed to abide by these
rules.
In respect to transportation, there are two ways to avoid con-
fIlets in ocean space: Traffic separation schemes and the fairway
system. Traffic separation areas comprise a central safety zone with
one way traffic lanes on either side of it. This scheme is more
appropriate for the prevention of collisions between ships. There is
one recommended for the Strait of Dover and there is a four-part
schem.e proposed for the North Sea which has not been instituted yet.
9~Ibid, p. 73.
94Convention on the Continental Shelf, Article 5 subparagraph 2.
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The primary international organization that deals with traffic
separation in the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion (IMeO). It recognizes that there is a great danger to shipping
from congestion in major shipping routes and that regulations should
be instituted to prevent collisions between ships. These recommenda-
tions are not binding on the members but IMca has recommended that its
m~er countries make it an offense for ships of their flag to proceed
against established flows in traffic separation schemes. 95 IMca has
done a great deal of work on the question of traffic safety and has
also proposed several resolutions on the establishment of fairways in
offshore exploration areas and for dissemination of information on the
location of oil and gas faciliti~s.96
The fairway system is noted more for its installation in the Gulf
of Mexico and was designed with the conflict between ships and oil
installations in mind. The idea is that there are lanes or fairways
where ships can travel through oil fields and where 011 rigs cannot
be established. Under this system, however, there are several problems
extant: 1) Many ships do not pay attention to the fairways because it
makes their trips longer. 2) Fishing boats cannot stay within fairways
95Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, The
Activities of the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion Pertaining ~ Ships' Routeing, Traffic Separation Schemes, Areas
to be Avoided ~ Certain Ships, and Related Questions, (IHea Pubn.
1972/2), Paragraph 25.
96Ibid , "Recommendation of Establishment of Fairways Through
Offshore E'Xploration Areas," Resolution A. 179(VI) and "Recommendation
on Disseminatian of Information, Charting, and Manning of Drilling
Rigs and Production Platforms." Resolution A, 180(VI) , pp. 20-21.
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because the nature of the industry forces them to follow the fish.
3) As drilling proceeds farther out into the sea, fairways have not
been establis~ed or lengthened to take this fact into account. 97
This last point is the most important because much of the drilling
in the North Sea is more than 100 miles out to sea and the fairway
system has yet to be tried this far from land.
Shipping faces another important problem in the North Sea, the
possibility of artificial islands being established in the sea,
especially aQ a part of the offshore oil and gas effort. The ~o5sible
establishment of these islands creates potential dangers to both
shipping and fishing and could seriously conflict with the interests
of the other states in the region. In international law, as e~bodied
in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea, an artificial
island could be considered as an installation necessary for the
exploration and exploitation.of the continental shelf. 98 As long as
the island does not unjustifiably interfere with the other uses of
the sea it would be permitted. Furthermore, under the Convention on
the High Seas, an artificial island could be regarded as a reasonable
I
j 99USe of the high sea and would be proper by law.
97H• Gary Knight, "Shipping Safety Fairways: Conflict Ameliora-
tion 1n the Gulf of Mexico," Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 1
(October 1969): 18-19.
98Convention ~ the Continental Shelf. Article 5 subparagraph 2.
99United Nations, Convention ~ the High Seas. (A/CO'NF.13 fL. 53.
1958), Article 2.
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The conflict in reference to artificial islands has, then, two
elements: 1) The physical cGnflict in the sea between islands used
in oil and gas exploitation and other uses of the sea, particularly
shipping and fishing; and 2) the legal conflict engendered by the
~terpretation of the reasonable use clause and the right to· establish
faciUties in the sea relating to the exploitation o'f the continental
shelf as permitting the estabiishment of artificial islands. Th~
physical conflict is imminent with the plans of the Netherlands to
construct an artificial island off its coast. The area involved is
in the vicinity of major coastal shipping routes and an island's
presen~e could prove disasterous for both shipping and the artificial
island. If shipping and fisheri,es operations are hampered b:' the
presence of the Dutch artificial island or any other one that mi~ht be
constructed, action would probably be taken by the other states using
the North Sea to protect their own interests.
This action would probably be judicial in nature. The legality
of these islands in international law is somewhat tenuous and a
detennination would have· to be made on whether an artificial island
constitutes a reasonable use of the sea and whether it is a necessary
part of continenta~ shelf exploitation. Ajudication on these points
would necessa~ily result in some bad feelings. If the stabe which
constructed the island loses, then a great deal of time and resources
have been wasted and offshore production might not be as efficient as
with the artificial island. On the other hand, if the shipping and
fishing interests lose, then a permanent i~pedtment to their activities
has been formalized. At any rate, the existence of artificial islands
11
in the North Sea would not serve as a benefit to regionalism in North-
western Europe unless some regional accommodation is made among all
the interests in the sea.
Coupled with the establishment of artificial islands and with
the offshore effort in general is the increased danger of oil pollu-
tion which could effect fisheries, coastal area$. and other sea-related
activities. Pollut~on can be caused by a blow-out at the well-head,
in transhipment to land by tanker or pipeline, or by the collision of
ships with oil and gas installations. While the danger of a major
spill is slight. a major oil spill originating from oil fields in the
central part of the North Sea would, due to wind movements t move
toward the Danish peninsula and parts of Norway.IOO This fact
demonstrates the international consequences of a major oil spill and
its importance as a possible centrifugal force in Northwestern Europe.
With fisheries the problems are slightly different. The
establishment of an oil installation and safety zone could close off
a traditionally rich fishing area. In such areas fish could also be
killed frOm exploration activities such as explosions. It is also
not clear what effect exploration and development activities have on
outright destruction or reduction of spawning in the fisheries. 10I
lOOUnited States Congress, North Sea Oil and Gas: Impact of
Development ~ the Coastal Zone, Committee~Comm~e, (93rd Congress,
2nd Session. Committee Print, p. 21.
lOlKenneth Dam, "Oil and Gas Lic:ensinf; in the North Sea."
Journal2f Law and Economics 8 (October 1965): 18-19.
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Pipelines could also endanger the fishing industry through loss
of nets or other equipment when they snag on the ocean bottom.
Finally, the fishing industry. dependent on ports in proximity to the
oil fields. could be hurt because the fleets cannot cope with the
higher docking charges and other expenses caused by the presence of
the oil industry.
The conflicts in the uses of the North Sea are very real. The
fact that a drilling rig was established on Dogger Bank, a prime
fishing area. as early as 1965102 demonstrates that definite means to
rectify any, and all. conflicts in the sea must be established. The
disputes that could ar~se between states intent on pursuing offshore
oil and gas and those staying with the more traditional uses of the
sea could initiate repercussions which could mean a decline of
regionalism in Northwestern Europe.
National Legal and Fiscal Variations in the Nortn Sea
Throughout Northwestern Euro'pe there are wide varia.tions in laws
and operating rules for those people involved with the offshore oil
and gas industry. This multiplicity of regulations results in con-
fusion, inefficiency, and, possibly, conflict. The lack of any common
pollution standards with enforcement provisions or safety codes can
endanger not only the people working on the offshore effort but also
the wellbeing of every person in the littoral states of the North Sea
102Richard Young, "Offshore Claims and ProbleIlLS in the North
Sea, ItAmerican Journal 0 f Interna tiona1 Law S9 (July 1965). p. 511.
,.,
who depend on it. International law does not require any common
standards and all laws are within the province of the coastal state.
This fact allows the countries of Northwestern Europe to establish
common opera~ing codes for the North Sea and its environs which could
increase regionalism in the area. However, there are, at present, no
actLve negotiations in pl;'ogr,ess for the rectification of these
d:1ffe't'ences.
The extreme variability !n legal and fiscal legislation can first
be shown by the types of laws used by the countries of Northwestern
Europe. Four countries, West Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and
the United Kingdom, have special laws governing offshore mining.
Belgium, France, and Ireland have general mining laws that are
applicable except when superceded by a special law. Denmark has only
a general law covering all mining and Luxembourg has no mining laws
at all. The content of these laws also shows acute differences. In
Belgium virtually all aspects of offshore mining are subject to
negotiation while Norway has seven separate and specific pieces of
legislation concerning offshore exp.loitation.
To avoid a detailed examination of all the countries in Nurth-
western Europe involved with offshore oil aad gas~ a brief summary of
the legal and fiscal standards of four counnries will be given. The
Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and Denmark have been selected
because they have, at this time, the greatest potential for offshore
oil and gas. They also have ratifted or a~ceded to the Continental
Shelf Convention.
..
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In Denmark103 all exploration and production licenses are granted
by royal decree. In both cases there is no fixed area covered by the
grants. In actuality, the exploration and production concessions are
granted simultaneously for a total duration of 50 years. There are
no taxes or fees for exploration rights and the companies will pay
taxes on the well-head value of production from territorial waters at
7.5% for the first five years and 12.5% thereafter. From the shelf,
production royalties are 5% for five years and 8% thereafter. The
Danish system is unusual because three Danish companies were granted
all rights in the offshore area, by royal decree, for the before
mentioned, 50 years.
The Netherlands has differ€nt requirements for those parties
interested in shelf exploration. There is no discrimination against
foreign companies except that tnose companies establish a local office
where the accounts are kept. Exploration rights are ~ranted by the
Minister for Economic Affairs with production rights usually given t,o
e~loration lease holders. There is also a non-exclusive reconnaissance
license for which the holder pays a flat sum for each square kilometer
explored. Exploration license holders pay a serie.s o,f bonuses and
sur~ace taxes throughout the fifteen years they hold these licenses.
Block sizel04 varies and there 1s a 50% reduction on size after ten
l03Unless otherwise noted all information comes from the OECO.
Mining ~nd Fiscal Legislation. Paris: DEeD, Tables VII, VIII, X. XI,
XII. XIV. XIX, XXI, XXIII, XXV, XXVII, AND XXIX.
l04In oil and gas activities the area, in acres 0r kilometers,
that the company receives under one concession is called a block. A
company can own one or more blocks.
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years. An appl!cant may win rights for production after demonstrating
the success of his exploration. and a license is granted for forty
years. Within the legal regulations established by the Dutch there is
a progressive royalty on production ranging from 0% to 16%. There is
also a profit sharing scheme where the state receives 50% of net prof-
its after an e~tra deduction of 10% for operating costs. Corporate
taxes are deducted from the state's profit share. lOS For non-compliance
wixh mining regulations. including pollution standa~ds. the Continental
Shelf Mining Act provides for a maximum of six months imprisonment and
a fine not exceeding f. 10,000. Repeated violations may lead to with-
drawal of the license. 106 Through 1972. 45 exploratory permits were
granted as well as I production license.
Norway's shelf regulations were first established in 1965 and
then changed in 1972. In Norway. exploration rights are granted by
the Minister of Industry to citizens or companies incorporated domes-
tically or, under nspecial circumstances," they could be given to
foreign companies. Reconnaissance licenses are granted for 3 years in
the area below 62 degrees North Latitude for an annual fee. Production
rights are for six years and can be renewed for thirty more. The block
is reduced by a half after six years and by one-quarter three years
later. However. no block can be smaller than 100 square kilometers.
ln 1965 all taxes on capital and income were subject to general
105The Netherlands. Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Mining
and Fiscal Legislation, (1973). pp. 17-18.
106Ibid, p. 17.
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legislative provisions with an average royalty of 12~% on production.
In 1972 the laws were changed so that the state could acquire a large
share of the profits coming from the North Sea oil and gas deposits~
The establishment of a State oil company with majority participation
in any offshore venture assured Norway of greater control over produc-
tion of the resources. In the new bill there 1s a series of taxes and
fees, as well as a graduated royalty from 8 to 16%. The licensee is
also required to land all production in Norway unless the King~ upon
appllcat±on~ approves some other landing point. The King may decide,
however, that the licensee return production equal to national demand
to Norway.l07 The Norwegians have also established extensive safety
re~ulations governing the conduct of offshore activities. Unfortunately~
this law does not establish actual liability or punitive measure for
pollution or other damage caused by subsea mining. Through 1972, 18
exploration permits and 36 production licenses were ~ranted.
The United Kingdom was the twenty-second nation to ratify the
Continental Shelf Convention which brought i.t into force. In the United
Kingdo~ only citizens or companies incorporated in Britain may hold
offshore licenses. There is also preferential treatment given in the
granting of the licenses to the companies that have contributed the
most to the development of Britain's fuel needs. A non-exclusive
I07Norway, Royal Ministry of Industry and Handicrafts, "ltoyal
Decree of 8 December 1972 Relating to Exp~oration for and Exploitation
of Petroleum in the Seabed and Substrata of the Norwe~ian Continental
Shelf~" in Legislation Concer~ing~ Norwegian Continental Shelf,
Unofficial Translation (Oslo~ 1973)~ Section 34.
'. -------..- ........~'"'--"'~.=-=-----~-=------
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exploration permit for the whole British shelf except the area under
production license is granted for three years. There is both a
r~gist~at1on fe.e and other taxes which must be paid by the exploring
company. A production permit is for six years with one renewal for
forty years. The holder can have up to.ten blocks of various sizes
and they need not be contiguous. There 1s a ban against resale of
blocks. There is also a 12.5% ta~ on well-head production and a series
of other registration fees and surface taxes.
The New Labour government is now trying to change the Continental
Shelf laws to increase government participation and income. They seem
to feel that too much of the profits are leaving the country. which
could be put to work in the United Kingdom. Under the new p~an, 1)
additional taxes would be imposed on ~ompany profits, 2) future
licenses would have majority participation by the government, 3) eXisting
licenses would be renegotiated so the state has majority participation,
4) the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC) WQuld be set up to
exercise participatory rights, and 5) further control over physical
108production and pipelines will be acquired for cons~rvation purposes.
The labor government also proposes extensive changes in the tax
laws so that the exchequer will gain its appropriate income from the
North Sea resources.
At this time the United Kin~dom also has what is probably the
etiffest oil pollution standard in Northwestern Europe. The
108Unit~d Kingdom Offshore Oil and Ga~ Policy, London: Ministry
of Energy, 1974, pp. 3-4.
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"Prevention of Oil Pollution Law of 1971" requires that anyone who
causes pollution as a result of carrying out activities on the
Continental Shelf will be subject to a fine not exceeding $125,000.
However, the fine will not be imposed if the person responsible proves
that pollution was not due to any want of reasonable care and that
all reasonable steps were taken for stopping or reducing it. l09
Governmental Behavior and Product~on Timetables
The extreme variability of laws and regulations g~verning off-
shore oil and gas exploitation is a product of the attitudes that the
respective countries have taken on the offshore oil and gas resources.
The United Kingdom drew up its laws so as to obtain the fastest
possible exploitation of the resources for its energy needs. NorwaYt
on the other hand, constructed its laws to control and minimize its
production because of the domestic problems rapid exploitation would
cause. The diverse nature of the production timetables and the
failure of other countries in Northwestern Europe to appreciate the
reasons behind the timetables could result in divisive tendencies
which could inhibit regionalism. The potential dispute is a three-
sided affair Which could prove disasterous for Northwestern Europe
in the long run. In an area that 15 as sensitive as the energy
problems facing the region today, anyone of these disputes could
effectively negate all previous regionalism stemming from coopel;'~tive
ventures ~elaced to other activities in the North Sea.
I09prevention of 011 Pollution law of 1971,11 in National Legisla-
tion and Treaties t Section 3.
c
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The first aspect of this possible conflict is between the
European Community and the national policies of specific member
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countries. While this dispute has not surfaced as yet there is a
very real possibility that it will appear in the next ten years. The
greatest potential for conflict is between the United Kingdom and the
Community., It will center around pre-emptive rights of the Community
for energy resources.
The objective of the United Kingdom is to exploit its offshore
resources as quickly as possible. The oil and gas is seen as a way
to end a deficit of $6 billion which is primarily the result of heavy
~eliance on foreign oil. 1lO The ending of this dependence is of
paramount importance to Britain because of the economic instf.bility
caused by such a large deficit. The official prediction now is,
allowing for new discoveries, for production in 1980 to be equivalent
111to demand. The theory also is that at the point when Britain be-
comes self-sufficient in oil she will no longer be competing for
KiddIe-East oil and at the point when she becomes a net exporter of
oil, other nations will be less dependent on KiddIe-East oil. 112
This idea is the same for natural gas and such a scenario points out
110lfUncertainty Delays North Sea 011," Boston Globe, 13 December
1974, p. 29.
lllUnited Kingdom, Department of Energy, "Production of oil and
gas in the United Kingdom," A ReE.9rt ~ the Secretary of State for
Energy, (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Offic~, May 1974), p. 2.
l12"Britain Pushes North Sea Oil,"~ York Times, 15 October
1973, p. 58.
80
that the United Kingdom wants to exploit its own oil and gas fQr it-
self, leaving the leftovers for the rest of Europe or whomever might
want to purchase it.
The European Community for its part seems to take a different
vi~~ and would like to see m.ore of a community approach to the
development of North Sea oil and gas resources that goes beyond the
previous EEe rulings. In a speech to a conference on the North Sea
by Fernard Spaak, Euratom Director, reference was made to the Community
interest in the North Sea. He states;113
The states affected should wish to maximize benefit.
But 1f the co~on objective is secure supplies of energy,
then maximum consideration should be given to the Community
as ~ whole. The Community should formulate a common energy
policy in such a manner that it makes the greatest cont1ibu-
tion to the North Sea oil and gas resources for the balanced
benefit of all concerned--regions, industry, and energy
consumers. (Italics added)
Spaak also commented: 114
We also believe it would be in the interest of the
COmmunity as a whole and perhaps also consistent with the
rules of the Cammon Market that, if pre-emptive rights are
to exist, they should be in favor of the Community rather
than in favor of any nation state.
The view of at least some influential members of the European
~unity is that the oil and gas in the North Sea should be common
property and that first rights to the oil would not be given to the
member state that originally owned the oil. This view would run
113Fernard Spaak, !lEEC Energy Policy and the North Sea," in North
~ Conference, (London: IPC Industrial Pre~s, LTD.), p. 59.
U.4Ibid , p. 59.
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afoul of the expressed British opinion that the resources are theirs
and the reserves will solve a particularly British problem. lIS If
the Community view prevails then fierce pressure will be exerted on
its present structure because of British dissatisfaction and possible
withdrawal from th~ Community.
The circumstances that are setting Norway apart fro~ the rest of
Northwest~rn Europe are much different than the problems facing the
United Kingdom and the EC. Norway is not a member of the Community
and does not have to worry about giving up sovereignty over their oil
and gas resources. In this case the area of dispute is Norway's avowed
policy of slow and gradual exploration and production of oil which seems
to "condemn Europe to continued oil dependency on member states of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries."ll6 Again regionalism
in Northwestern Europe is threatened because there is a lack of
appreciation among the states in the region for the problems and needs
of other countries.
The Norwegians have specific national priorities and have set up
their polic~es on the North. Sea oil and gas resources with the domestic
situation in mind. In terms of population. Norway is a small country
~th only 4 mil1ion people. It is endowed with large amounts of
115Britain is now a member of the energy sharing plan of the oil
consuming nations. However, British attitude toward this plan may
be changed when they become self-sufficient in oil. The change could
be that the United Kin~dom would be reluctant to share their oil and,
as a result, drop out of the organization.
116.. "Oslo Go-Slow Policy Casts Pall on Oil Fair, New York Times,
11 September 1974, p. 61.
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hydroelectric power, which has meant that Norway has not become highly
dependent on either oil or gas as an energy source. By 1981 Norway
is expected to earn about $3 billion a year from their oil and gas
exports, but the economy can only absorb about $1.1 billion. 117
Besides the fa~t that Norway cannot use all the money it is exPected
to earn from the North Sea projects, there are severe strains being
placed on its economy from the offshore industry. Unemplo~ent has
never been a problem in Norway and the increased employment needs of
the petroleum industry have cr~ated severe sector imbalances with many
employees leaving small fishing, agriculture, or industrial concerns
to take jobs connected with 011. 118 The specter of inflation resulting
from the large injection of oil money into the economy is alEO a
persistent worry which, in the long run, may prove to be the most
critical problem of the Norwegian government.
To combat the problems of prosperity brought by the North Sea
resources the Norwegian government has put severe limitations on the
oil industry. As shown earlier they demand participation in all
projects on the continental shelf,_have allowed no drilling or
exploratory work above 62 degree NQrth Latitude, and have opened up
only 25% of the area belo~ this li~e for leasing. Moreover, they will
now take up to 80% of all profits derived from commercial oil and gas
117Norway Seeks Ways to Absorb Oil Funds Without Discomfort;"
Wall Street Journal, 8 June 1974, p. 1.
118"Oi1 Income Brings Problems to Venezuela and Norway," New
York Times, 25 November 1974, sec 2, p. 49.
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119fields ending what they saw as huge oil company profits. All these
efforts to insulate Norway from the worst problems of oil and gas
exploitation have ramifications for the rest of Northwestern Europe.
It is the new attitude and perception of itself as an oil exporter
(as opposed to an Impo~te~) which appears to set No~ay apart from the
rest of the region and to suggest adverse consequences on regionalism.
In September 1974 negotiations were in progress to construct a
pact whereby the oil-importing nations of Europe, the United States
and Japan would share their oil resources in case of a new Arab oil
embargo. Norway was expected to be a participant in this agreement.
During the negotiations, however, an informal source said that the
Norwegian government was, uconsidering a neutral position bet.ween OPEC
and the consumers.,,120 The final result was the refusal of Norway to
join the oil sharing program of the International Energy Agency, the
oil consumer group. The country's position is that the agency is for
importers and Norway will soon be an oil exporter. By this position
the government of Norway has set itself apart from the rest of North-
western Europe and has indicated that. in reference to the North Sea
oil and gas, their country is different and will essentially pursue
policies which are contrary to the rest of the region.
119"Norwegian Oil: The 'Blue Eyed' Arabs," Duns Review, August
1974, p. 64.
120"Os~o Go-Slow Policy Casts Pall on Oil Fair, If p. 61.
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Chapter 7
THE POTENTIAL FOR REGIONALISM IN NORTHWESTERN EUROPE
In the two preceding chapt,ers the forces for and ~gainst regionalism
have been examined. Both co-operation and divisiveness are present.
The more powerful and influential of the two will ultimately determine
the e~act role that offshore oil and gas exploitation will play in the
development of a regional consciousness. If co-operation is a strong
and viable force, then the ongoing process of regionalization will be
promoted. If conflict is the stronger, then a setback will be dealt
to those wanting a stronger regionalism. Any potential for the develop-
ment of a special regime in the North Sea will be based on wh~ch force
1s the most pervasive.
Significance of Centripetal Forces
The various areas in which co-operation in the North Sea has ad-
vanced show that bilateral and multilateral efforts can result in
benefits being achieved by all the parties involved. A spirit of
regional co-operation should result in heightened regionalism based
on successful experiences shared by all. Familiarity diminishes
suspicion and a series of beneficial negotiations can create a frame-
work which should be the basis for further regional consensus. However,
a critical examination of the ao-operative efforts in the North Sea
leaves open to question the extent to which regionalism in Northwestern
Europe has actually been 1ncre4sed.
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The "Agreement to Prevent Pollution of the North Sea by Oil"l2l
is a prime example of what actually has been gained through inter-
national negotiation. What, on the surface, may look to be an
important step toward solving the pollut10~ problems created by oil
is. in actuality, an empty agreement which does not appreciably
advance either the control of pollution or regional co-operative
efforts. The agreement does not set any preventive standards. It
does not require penalties for violators of pollution codes; and it
does not set down, even in principle, that a common standard is either
needed or desired. The requirement that the participating nations
notify other signatories that oil pollution exists and request help
if needed, is an idea that is nc"t particularly significant. Any
establishment of pollution standards and enforcement is still the
province of the coastal state and it does not seem evident that the
state will soon give up its sovereign right to legislate pollution
codes, even if a common standard would be for the regional good.
The resource agreements among Norway, the United Kingdom, and the
Federal Republic of Germany are a much better ex~ple of regional co-
operation. 122 Both Britain and West Germany have given up to Norway
some taxation rights on facilities which process hydrocarbons from the
Norwegian oil and gas fields. They also relinquished the right to
enforce their laws on the pipelines and installations built on their
continental shelf used for transporting Norway's oil and gas. In
121See c~apter 5, pp. 56-57.
122See chapter 5, pp. 57-59.
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this case Norwegian law and its enforcement provisions were applicable.
It must be emphasized, though, that Norway's decision to send
her oil by way of other countries was based solely on necessity.
Although the Norwegian government would have preferred that the re-
sources be landed in its own country, it was not technologically
feasible to build a pipeline to Norway. The inefficiency of other
transport methods, principally tanker, can be demonstrated by the fact
that p,roduct10n from the Ekofish fields declined in 1973 because bad
weather hampered tanker loadings. 123 The United Kingdom and West
Germany, for their part, were Willing to make some concessions; since
the oil and gas is to be landed in their countries, they would probably
have the first opportunity to buy the production that was not ~eturned
to Norway.
Many international agreements are based on necessity and mutual
advantage, not on choice. This fact is important in the development
of regionalism and should not be minimized. Cohesion has been pro-
mated by the negotiatio~ of these agreements. When other events occur
in the North Sea that also require cooperation, regionalism will again
be helped.
As stated earlier, the delimitation of boundaries in the North
Sea was probably the most significant part of the cooperative efforts
to date, and that the North Sea is one of the two sea regions in the
world where this delimitation has taken place. There must be a
differentiation made, however. between 1) the regional significance
123 .Robert E. King, "Petroleum Production in Europe in 1973."
p. 1974. \
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of the process of which negotiations of the boundaries are a part,
and 2) the actual meaning of legal sea boundaries in a regional con~
text. The fact that negotiations actually took place and a s@lution
was reached to a potentially divisive issu~ (disputes over the
ownership of the oil and gas) demonstrates an increase in intrare-
g~onal contacts and a willingness to peacefully solve problems
affecting everyone. Moreover, the respect for law as a basis for
regionalism was promoted by the willingness of· certain parties to
submit their boundary disagreements to the International Court for
adjudication. In this sense the boundary delimitation in the North
Sea has helped the process of regionalization; but, with the legal
recognition of continental shelf boundaries, the very nature of
boundaries constitutes a force which is not sympathetic to the idea
of regionalism.
the study of boundaries and their function is an old and respected
part of political geography. Ladis Kristoff in his article on the
"Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries"124 mak~s several comments on
boundaries which have significance to this study. The first is that
boundaries are inner-oriented and maintained by the will of the central
government. l25 Kristoff also sees boundaries as a separating factor
which impedes integration across the borderline. 126 With these ideas
124Ladis Kristoff, "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries,11 Annals
of the Association of American Geographers, 49 (March 1959): 269-282.
US1bid, p. 272.
126Ibid , p. 273.
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the boundaries in the North Sea~ despite being created by international
agreement, are actually a separating factor reinforcing the power of
the individual states rather than that of the region. Sea boundaries
eztend state control to a larger area and reduce the necessity for,
and desirability of, reaching an agreement on regional needs. As the
continental shelf is apportioned among the littoral states, problems
wbdch were traditionally communal are now assigned to individual
states.
Boundaries in the sea promulga~e the multiplicity of laws in the
sea, limiting cohesion. If the sea could once be called a fron~ier
with the integrating factor of mutual penetration and sway,l27 then
the formal acceptance of shelf boundaries limits interaction. In the
years from 1965 to 1971 a high level of communication throughout the
region was maintained because of negotiations on boundaries. Since
tben~ with the formal acceptance of most bo1.D1.dar1.es, a decline in
inter-governmenta~activity associated with North Sea oil and gas re-
sources can be noted. 128
Wi.th the decline of inter-governmental activity on North Sea
0:11 and gas exploitation, the development of complementary values and
the ability to respond and adapt to chan~es stemming from the North
121Ibid, p... 273.
128Through 1971, all boundary agreements, the pollution agree-
ments, EEC decrees on the Continental Shelf, and most of the resource
agreements were made.
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Sea have been temporarily checked. 1i9 For regionalism to be main-
tained and increased, communication throughout the region must occur.
Responses to value changes can only be developed if the flow of
information among the regional partners is continued at a fairly
steady rate. However~ the low level of governmental communication
at this time does not necessarily negate the regional benefits that
have been achieved.
A1l the centripetal factors that have been considered may not,
in themselves, represent a significant increase in regional cohesion;
but taken together with the regional fishing arrangements, the common
oceanographic interests of Northwestern Europe, and the non-govern-
mental influence of the multi-national corporations, a permanent
reservoir of forces for North Sea regionalism has been developed.
Fisheries and scientific research are organizational interests which
~11 continue to focus regional attention on the North Sea. The
problems of research and fishery stock depletion are of area-wide
CODce and agreements will be made to protect common needs. The
multi-national corporation working in the North Sea will always be a
non-governmental influence with the economic power to help mold
governmental policies on a regional level and assure themselves that
disputes do not hurt their own interests in the North Sea. Finally,
it will be to the advantage of the other organizational interests in
129Within both neo-func~ionalismand communications theory the
structural support for integration are complementary values and
responsivenes~. The establishment and maintenance of these supports
are an important aspect of regionalism. See Chapter 3.
90
the North Seat particularly the EEe, to lobby for a regional solution
for the North Sea because it will help reinforce its own interests
for the progressive integration of the area. While t to date,
regionalism in Northwestern Europe may not have been increased by
the communal efforts in the North Sea there has been developed a basic
structure for continued regionalism which ~ill not be easily destroyed
and a foundation from which common values and responsiveness can be
developed.
Importance of Divisive Factors in the North Sea
After eXamining the significance of those efforts which purport
to increase regionalism one must then examine how important the
potentially divisive forces in the North Sea are in retarding the
process of regionalization. Conflict in the uses of the seat varia-
tions in national operating rules, as well as different national
policies and production timetables could create friction which would
break down any regional consensus. The important factor here, though,
is whether some or any of the littoral states perceive these centrifugal
forces as actual problems worthy of regional debate.
Conflicts in the uses of the sea is one such area where the con-
cern shown by the academic community and the relatively few people
who are directly affected 1s not reflected at the governmental level.
Calls for a tribunal to solve these conflicts between oil and gas
explsitation and other uses of the gea130 have not met with any success.
130Richard Young, p. 522.
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Furthermore, no concrete vehicles have been created to determine what
actually constitutes "unjustifiable interference"l31 and to debate
the merits of oil and gas exploitation versus fishing or transport in
certain areas of the sea. One of the few countries which has actually
legislated any concern for the effect that oil and gas exploration has
on other sea uses is the Netherlands which requires that when explosives
are used in seismic work, they must be supervised by a fishing expert. 132
If there is any debate on conflict in the uses of the sea it is
not on an international scale but rather internal, between different
segments of the national population. In Scotland, for example, it has
been reported that the fishing fleets have moved from Aberdeen to
other, lower cost, ports~ The fishermen could not cope with :he
higher costs resulting from competition over port facilities. 133
Fishermen are also unhappy over the safety zones being placed around
offshore installations which .close off fishing areas. A further
problem 1s the debris which has been scattered on the ocean floor as
a result of seabed exploitation. While the oil cempanies have assumed
liability for damage to fishing gear the incidence of debris makes
it impossible to detect if the gear is lost on a pipeline or other
l3lConvention on the Continental Shelf, Article 5(1) requires
that shelf exploitation shall not result in any "unjustifiable
interference in the uses of the sea." See chapter 6, pp. 66-67
for further elaboration.
132The Netherlands, Mining and Fiscal Legislation, p. 1.
133United States, Congress, p. 17.
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equipment related to oil and gas activities or just junk. In the
latter case the oil companies take no responsibility and no compensa-
tion is forthcoming. l34 In the future, as oil activities multiply
in the North Sea, the littoral states may ~ake a more active interest
in the conflicts arising from multiple uses of the sea. At present,
bowever, it 1s not thought to be a major regional problem worthy of
active consideration.
The problems created by the multiplicity of national legislation
and operating rules in the North Sea are different in scope and focus.
With the formal division of the seabed by treaty the sovereignty and
applicability of the coastal state's laws become finalized. Despite
the EEC's determination that th£ continental shelf is covered by
Article 52 of the Rome Treaty requiring free entry for member states,135
laws have not changed in the last several years to harmonize this
aspect of shelf activity. The desirability of at least a common
pollution and safety standard has been recognized by some people in
the region. 136 However, it does not appear that the member states of
the EEC are 1n a hurry to implement community decrees, much less to
willingly commit themselves to a single set of criteria for the
totality of North Sea operations.
134Ibid • p. -20
135See footnote 23 above on p. 20.
136Jens Evensen, "Problems of International Law and International
Politics," in North Sea Oil: Th~ Challenge and Implications. (Edin-
burgh: Heroit-Wait University, 1973), p. 40.
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Harmonized operating rules in the North Sea would provide two
benefits: 1) A more efficient exploitation of the North Sea resources
because the participating concerns would construct all facilities to
meet a common code instead of changing methods to meet the requirements
of eight different nations. 2) Protection for the coastal state from
oil spills created by the lax standards of one country and a speeding
up of clean-up activities because all nations in the region would ,be
required to help, not just the few directly affected. Unfortunately,
it might take a disaster on the scale of the spill in the Santa
Barbara channel in California or the recent tanker spill near Singapore
to spur the nations of Northwestern Europe to action. In fact, com-
placency might have already set in because the North Sea has, so far,
been remarkably free from any major oil spills resulting from the off-
shore activities. Even the Torrey Canyon tanker spill had a minimum
coastal impact and did not greatly alarm the region. Because the
nations of Northwestern Europe have not been troubled by the proplems
of diverse laws in the sea they do not see any problems which could
cause regional friction.
However, both the conflict in the uses of the sea and the lack of
harmony on operating codes in the North Sea are a possible threat to
regionalism. Even though the littoral states do not, as, yet, see them
as difficulties they are a potentially divisive force for the future.
If a major oil spill does occur because of lax operating codes it
will affect everyone and could develop into a point of contention
throughout the region. Furthermore, a severe decline in fishery catch
or interference with shipping interests of the region could engender
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disputes between the offshore 011 producing states and the other states.
This fact represents a viable threat to the future of regionalism in
Northwestern Europe and it will be interesting to see if the existing
supports for regionalism will recognize these issues and take steps to
prevent them from occurring.
For the moment, the greatest threat to regionalism in. North-
wes~ern Europe is the behavior of the nations in respect to their
production timetables for the North Sea. The avowed goal of the
Norwegians is to limit production, leave large areas of their aontin-
ental shelf unexplored and demand a la~ge state participation in order
to acquire the maximum amount of revenue from the offshore enterprise.
The nation has set policies which meet their perceived domestic and
international necessities. They also feel that they can contribute
to the energy needs of the region. However, it will be done on their
terms. The rest of Northwestern Europe is, admittedly, very unhappy
over the policies of Norway. They feel that the Norwegians should put
more emphasis on the regional energy problems. Beneath this budding
attack on regionalism is a change in values as well as a lack of
appreciation and responsiveness to the needs of the different countries
of Northwestern Europe.
Shared Values and Responsiveness in Northwestern Europe
Earlier in this paper137 a discus~ion was presented on Deutsch's
137See Chapter 3. The similarity be~7een the two aspects of
communication to be mentioned and two structural supports of neo-
functionalism has already been stated. See p.
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communication theory, which identified two major factors which are
necessary in the development of regional cohesion. The two factors
were "eompat'ability of major values" and "mutual responsiveness. II
Such major values as constitutionalism were demonstrated in the
development of a base level for regionalism. Responsiveness was
so~ething developed so that countries in the region could predict
each other's behavior and act accordingly. It is these two vital
necessities within the development of regionalism which have the
potential of breaking down in Northwestern Europe.
Major values are designated as values of major importance in
the polittcs of the units concerned. -This means that no value will
be considered Impot:tant in the relations between political Ul.itS
unless it is important within each of them, and is also considered
important in their common relationships.l38 In today's political
environment one's energy sit~ation and whether one is a n<;onsuming"
or "producing" nation now connotes a value not previously considered
as such. In an era of energy shortages and embargoes a country's
energy picture is of vital importance to its domestic needs as well
as a part of its international political and economic relations. If
a region has solely energy producers or cons~ers~ this value produces
an affinity for regional relations. Howeve~, if one or more country
changes this value ~hen a different set of tenSions is created •
. Norway, while not a heavy importer of energy, was heretofore an
energy conSW!ler, importing all its petroleum needs. Using an "energy"
138 12Karl Deutsch, e.t. a1. ~ p. 3.
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value they were tied to the problems, needs, and values of the rest
of Northwestern Europe. Now their values are changing. It has been
reported that Norway, as a net exporter of oil, will have interests
in common with the traditional producer countries. The government
therefore expects to establish closer contacts and co-operation with
these countries, i.e. with the member nations of OPEC. 139 This change
in-values and the movement of Norway from a consuming to a producing
nation will inhibit any extensive regionalism for the North Sea. It
might not result in any severe decline in regional relations, but it
will certainly create suspicion and mistrust of Norway's policies with
a possible spillover into other areas of contact.
Coupled with the change of values and its consequences, is a lack
of responsiveness in the area to the changes that are taking place.
The thirty years of peaceful co-operation and exchange of idea should
have created a foundatioQwhereby this change of values in the region
would be met by 'conciliation, negotiation, and the willingness to
compromise. All parties in Northwestern Europe have failed in this
regard. Norway has embarked on a path of conservation and the limtting
of its production which ~ay be a very intelligent policy; it could,
in the long run, actually be beneficial for the region. However~ she
has failed to appreciate the immediate consequences of her policy and
the appearance that she is working against the best interests of
Northwestern Europe.
139,.Summary from the Parliament Proposition No. 25, It Noroil
(1974): 2.
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ways and could not indefinitely continue policies which are at odds
with the region. Not only is Norway integrated into the regional
economy by trade but the resource agreements have also shown that it
is dependent on other countries in the area for the landing of its
energy resources. Furthermore, the recent trade agreement which has
been negotiated between Norway and the EEC for the pregressive aboli-
tion of tariffs indicate that Norway is increa~ingly becoming a
permanent fixture in the regional economic structure.
The f~ct that Norway is so much a part of the region is important
on two levels: 1) The regional infrastructure of which Norway 1s a
member will, in the future, generate the cQmmUnication needed for
the adaptation of responses to the needs of the whole region; and
2) regionalization in the North Sea will not progress without the
~tal presence of Norway. For the present. regionalism is not con-
tinuing by means of t~e oil and gas exploitation in the North Sea.
There are definite problems that need to be o~ercome by the littoral
states. However, in the future, the existing interdependence of
Northwestern Europe will encourage the development of answers to the
questions that have arisen.
·:t. ....
Chapter 8
CONCWSICNS AND PROPOOAIS
When this study was initiated its intent was to discover the
forces emanating from the North Sea which would increase or retard
regionalism in Northwestern Europe. These forces flow throughout the
region exerting pressures either for further regionalism or against
the cohesion that already exists. Since then, it has become evident
that, for the moment, the fact of North Sea oil a~d gas exploitation
has created more problems for regional relations that it has solved.
If these resources were discovered many years ago, then the problems
would not have been as acute. Unfortunately, the tremendous price
increases of hydrocarbons has fostered extreme sensitivity to energy
related policies. This sens~tivity has resulted in a temporary
suspension in the development of regionalism while individual states
. .
search for an appropriate energy program and determine what role the
North Sea resources will play in this program.
Both the policies of the United Kingdom and Norway can be seen
in this light. They are promoting courses of action which best suit
their own domestic needs. Norway limits production and exploration
because she wants to conserve the resources for as lang as possible.
The United Kingdom's intention is to exploit her resources as rapidly
as possible to eliminate the deficit in its balance of payments and
~re its chronic economic ills. As these countries develop their
own perceptions on the uses of North Sea all and gas and implement
them as national policy the pro~ulgatian of a regional scheme for the
North Sea is made more difficult.
,
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Problems of the North Sea
Given t~e different policies of Norway, the United Kin~dom. and
other countries in Northwestern Europe, the cause of regionalism in
the area has not been significantly increased. It was originally
felt that the process of regionalization would be helped by North Sea
011 and gas exploitation. It was hypothesized14l that the high cost of
imported oil and the fact that oil and gas were found in the North
Sea would benefit regionalism. This would have come about through
the damage to the regional economy by the present high cost of oil
that would force Northwestern Europe to come together to share and
manage the energy resources found within the region.
This hypothesis has proven to be false. There are four reasons
why this bas been so:
1) The discovery of oil and gas in the North Sea has restructured
major values in the region. Norway's new perception of herself as an
"energy producer" and what this value means, both domestically and
internationally, has set her apart from the rest of the region. This
new value has loosened cohesion in the area and has made the possibility
of a regional agreement being arrived at for the North Sea much more
difficult to achieve.
2) The nations of Northwestern Europe have not been responsive
to this chang~ in values and, as a result, have not created a method
whereby all regional members could adapt to the changes that are
occurring. This fact may be a microcosm of world events in general;
141See Chapter I, p. 11.
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the producing and the consuming nations have not reached any firm
understanding of each other's needs and prOblems.
3) The important organizational vehicles in Northwestern Europe 7
which is tne basis for regionalism, have not, as yet, succeeded in
promoting any definitive ~egional programs directed toward the North
Sea oil and gas resources. Fu~thermoTe, neIther the EEC, because
Norway is not a member, nor any other regional organization has
succeeded in bringing together all of the states in Northwestern
Europe with the intention of ameliorating national policy conflicts.
4) While the whole process of negotiation on continental shelf
boundaries in the North Sea has proven to be bene£icial for intra-
regional contact and understanding, the formal acceptance of the
boundaries have tended to limit the littoral state's view of the North
Sea. With the individual coastal states being solely responsible for
the activities on their continental shelves, these states do not see
the shelf as a regional entity. Rather the states see their juris-
dictional zones as separate from the others and an area subject to
their own particular laws and regulations. This fact has encouraged
the state to see such problems as conflict in the uses of the sea as
national problems, not regional ones.
Due to the above four factors, regionalism in the North Sea has
not been promoted. In fact, if some accommodation is not made to the
new forces that do exist in the region there is a possibility of a
decline in the existing level of regionalism. At the very least,
regional cohesion will tend to remain static durinK the next several
y~ars.
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However, there is, in several areas, pressure in Northwestern
Europe for the development of a regional consensus on the North Sea.
1) Continued conflict in the uses of the sea will eventually focus
regional concern on the offshore Qil and gas and encourage the area
to develop a program whereby the development of the offshore resources
will blend in with the other, traditional uses of the sea instead of
competing against them for space. 2) The possibility of accelerated
environmental deterioration ste~ng from increased offshore pro-
duction will necessitate policies that will minimize oil pollution,
a danger to all littoral North Sea Sta,tes; and 3) The economics of
North Sea oil and gas production will require regional agreement for
the sharing of facilities and the harmonization of laws so that those,
people involved in the offshore enterprise will be able to develop
the oil and gas fields as rationally, efficiently, and inexpensively
as possible.
Finally, there is pressure for a solution on the North Sea from
the whole political and economic infrastructure in Northwestern Europe
which fosters regional integration. Despite the temporary halt in
the development of regionalism it has already been shown that there
is a firm basis for regionalism in Northwestern Europe and the s-tructural
supports for this cohesion permeates throu~hout the area. These
supports, as manifested in regional organizations and economic inter-
dependence, will continue to serve as a focal point for regionalism
and eventually bring the region together for the development of a
special regime in the North Sea.
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The regime may not be, as originally proposed,142 a supra-
national one, but some sort of intraregional commission will
eventually be set up to act as a focal point on regional compromise.
A determination on the role that the North Sea and its continental
shelf resources will play in Northwestern Europe will be made in
order for disputes to be minimized and regionalism maintained.
! Regime for the-North Sea
With the North Sea being the focus of intense activity and
subject to pressure for some regional management scheme, a model
should be proposed upon which a future regime could be based. This
regime will not provide any easy solutions for the regional problems
of Northwestern Europe, and any actual regime of similar conten~ would
be attained only by hard and prolonged negotiations.
The following are nine points which would set up a regime for
the North Sea oil and gas resources, and provide for_an efficient
management and utilization of the resources.
1) A commission, composed of every state in Northwestern Europe,
would be set up to administer the continental shelf of the region.
Policy inputs by the member countries should be allowed, but no
overt external control should be put on the commission.
2) The area to be covered by this regime would be focused on
tRe North Sea, but should include all shelf areas which are divided
among member nations. The commission should also have authority over
1425ee hypothesis 2, p. 11.
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the development in the coastal zones of the member nations which are
used for continental shelf activity.
3) The commission should be empowered to make policy on all
aspects of offshore oil and gas exploitation and other activities on
the continental shelf. The central authority will determine leasing
arrangement$, taxes fees, and royalties, as well as such operation
code.s as safety and pollution standards. Companies applying for
concessions must be incorporated in the region and the commission
should require that it have majority participation in all production
efforts.
4) A regional company should be set up to exercise participatory
rights and to insure that excess profits are not leaving the region.
S} The commission should establish regulations so that oil and
gas exploitation does not interfere with the other uses of the sea.
6) Production should be apportioned throughout the region on the
baais of need.
7) After all costs of the commission are deducted, the profits
from the offshore enterprise should be distributed in the region
based on the oil and gas contribution that was made. The previous
shelf boundary lines would be used to determine which country contributed
what percentage of the resources. 143 If a member country contributes
no income from the offshore enterprise it will pay a flat fee to help
defray the costs of the commission.
143Under this idea, if the United Kingdom contributed 100% of the
resources they would get 100% of the profits. If Britain contributed
50% and NO'IWay 30% they would get 50% and 30% respectively with the
remaining profits distributed accordingly.
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The 'rest of the region, for its part, has also not been responsive,
first to the needs of Norway and second to the long run implication
of her policies. The rest of Northwestern Europe does have some legiti-
mate complaints, but it has not, as yet, instituted any means whereby
these complaints could be harmonized with the needs of Norway. A
breakdown in communication within the region over energy policies
seems to be the cause of the decline in a responsiveness th~t has
previously been developed in the area.
The decline of responsiveness in Northwestern Europe could result
in a new form of regionalism in the area. This new form would be
among the EEC members and it would exclude Norway from active regional
C:cnsultations. Even as of today the members of the EEC have re-
affirmed their intentions to transform, before the end of the Seventies,
the whole complex of their relations into a European union. 140 the
EEC has ambitious plans for a complete economic and monetary union,
and a common energy policy under consideration, as well as having a1-
ready developed North Sea programs on fisheries and on the continental
shelf. All these activities present a picture of regionalism apart
from Norway.
Despite this potential for Norway's disappearance from regionalism t
it is felt that ultimately an accommodation will be made between the
EEC members and Norway. In Northwestern Europe there has been developed
a whole infrastructure of e~onomict political, and atrategic inter-
dependencies. Norway is tied into these regional structures in ma.ny
140Great ~~itaint British Membership of the European CommunitYt
p. 37.
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8) A judicial body would be set up as a part of the commission
to solve all legal issues connected with the continental shelf enter-
prise. All member states. individuals. or companies would have
recourse to ~his court. Countries outside the region would also be
able to register legal complaints.
9) The guiding philosophy of the commission should not be the
most rapid exploitation of the resour,ces but, rather. the optimal
exploitation. for the greatest benefit of the region, for the longest
period of time.
Unfortunately, the operation of such a regime would have many
attendant problems. Despite the previously mentioned pressure for
the development of this commission, serious opposition to its initia-
tion will be encountered on several fronts.
The first objection would be from the coastal states, because
they would have to give up a measure of sovereignty in order for the
commission to work efficiently. To renounce control over the use and
distribution of resources that a state previously owned c~u1d be
viewed as a serious affront to its rights as a nation and would be
opposed. An energy hungry Europe might also oppose a rational
exploitation and opt for the most rapid production possible to
alleviate their energy problems. Furthe~ore. both the states con-
tribut~ng the ~jority of the resources and the states using the oil
and gas might feel that they are Riving up more than they are receiving.
The producer states would feel that they are contributing too much to
the maintenance of the commission and not getting a good enough
return. On the other hand, the user states could feel that they are
. .
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paying both for the commission and the resources and, for that rea$on
are not achieving any real economic benefits.
The second area of opposition would come from the companies that
are exploiting the North Sea. While a unified set of operating rules
for the North Sea would be supported, the offshore industries would
be very reluctant to accept strict production controls and commission
majority participation which would minimize profits. In such a case
many fields would be declared uncommercial and valuable production
would .not come to market. This fact is exemplified by recent events
in the United Kingdom where the oil companies claim that some oil
reserves will not be commercial if the British Government institutes
policies which limit company pro~its.144
Finally, opposition would be encountered from some of the
previously institutionalized or~anizational interests, particularly
the EEC. Any commission that is established now would preclude EEe
control because Norway is not a member. However, the economic in-
fluence of the EEC might be impared by this new commission and would
be opposed in order to prevent the erosion of its own powerful
in£luence.
Any commission for the North Sea would have to be established in
light of these oppositional forces. In order for it to maintain its
own independent integrity and function with a minimum of constraints
it must have supra-national characteristics that are above the direct
control of its member states. It should have at least four functioning
144"Britain Hobbles North Sea Oil," New York Times, 9 February
1975, sec F, p. 3.
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bodies which would provide adequate direction and also protect diverse
regional interests. The highest, decision-making body would ~e a
secretariat made up of people agreed upon by the member states, but
'who have no direct links to any particular state or interest group.
Second would be a group of ministers representing the members. This
body would agree upon and recommend policies for the commission which
could then be rejected or amended by the secretariat. To protect
member interests, a unanimous rejection of a program by the· council
of ministers would be binding on the secretariat. A third body would
be a congress composed of business, financial, labor, political, and
other interests Which could develop programs fo~ the commission and
pro~de information for the secretariat. The fourth body would be
the" court whose members would also have no direct national links.
In the operation of this four part commission, liaison relattons
would have to be established with the other fishery, oceanographic,
and economic organizations in the region. These relations would
ensure that all programs for the North Sea oil and gas resources
would be in harmony with all other programs and serve to negate any
severe conflicts of interest and the usurption of functions previously
enjoyed by other regional groups. A commission for the North Sea
continen~al shelf resources designed with the above recommendations
in mind would allow for the most efficient exploitation of the North
Sea, with the least friction, for the balanced benefit of the whole
region.
App11.cabl1ity of Study!£. Other Re.gions
There 1s a great ·danger 1n trying to apply studies based on a
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European Model to other regions of the world. Regional possibilities
at a European level cannot be reproduced in other contexts because
the necessary preconditions exist to a much lesser degree. 145 The
potential for increasing regionalism in Northwestern Europe is based
on the social structure and ideological patterns, as well as the
economic and industrial development of the region. These factors
have allowed for a long period of peaceful coope~ation and for the
establishment of organizational structures upon which regional cohesion
is based. While there is, at the moment, a breakdown of responsiveness
within the community due to a reorientation of values it can be seen
as a momentary aberration which will, in the future, be resolved when
responses are created by the existing infrastructure to meet the new
regional realities. No region in the world has achieved as close an
affinity as Northwestern Europe in the area of regional relations.
Furthermore, the infrastructure that does exist in Northwestern
Europe, developed through historical experience, has an integrative
ability which is not present in most of the semi-enclosed sea regions
of the world. As the regional supports of cOhesion in Northwestern
Europe become institutionalized they will promote regional policies
in order to maintain and justify their existence. This fact consti-
tutes a permanent force for re~ionalism in the area. Most of the
other semi-enclosed sea regions are made up of developing countries
which have not had the time, money, or interest to develop such
l4SErnst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and
the Universal Process," p. 389.
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sophisticated regional structures. Economically and politically the
developing nations must focus most of their attention inward so they
can solve urgent domestic problems. As a result the type of infra-
structure that exists in Northwestern Euro~e has not had the opportunity
to develop.
However, it is by no means definite that other regions in the
world cannot also achieve regionalism, apart from the European model,
based on some converging interests peculiar to them. 146 There 1s no
universal model for regionalism and the actual potential for regionali-
zation would have to be determined on a case by case study. Despite
this fact, it is felt that some definite points can be made on what
to look for when considering the possibility of regionalism. These
points are particularly aimed at regionalism in semi-enclosed seas.
1) The region, as a whole, and every political unit within that
region should look upon the sea as a major interest or value. By
this statement it is meant that the states should have a definite
interest ia the sea147 be it strategic, economic, or political. While
by no ~eans absolute, the potential for regionalism is best when the
interests of the state are relatively similar.
2) The region should be non-exclusionary. That is, one or more
states should not be prevented from participating in any regional
l46 Ibid, p. 389.
147For the difficulties in determining the interest that a nation
has in the sea, see Lewis M. Alexander, "Indices of National Interest
in the Oceans," Ocean Development and International Law 1 (Spring,
1973): 21-49.
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d~a1ogue on sea policy because of political or economic reasons. 148
This Is especially important if the country being excluded has a
major sea interest and is able to maintain it in the face of
opposition.
3) There should be, at least, some previous means whereby
CODllllUIl~cation in the reg:;l.on has been carried on. If not, any early
reg~onal agreements on sea policy would have to be relatively non-
controversial so as noc to create any early friction or clashes of
interest.
4} Regionalism in an area will often be determined by the
'external political and economic environment:. The creation of regional
cohesion centered on a sea might be fostered or prevented by catalysts
apart from the immediate area. 149
The major problem confronting regionalism in semi-enclosed sea
areas ~s the heterogeneity of the units in the area and their diverse
pol~tical and economic interests. To find a common ground where these
interests can converge is vexing, not only to the local policy maker
but also to the student of regionalism. It does appear that the
potential for regionalism in the sea is relatively low, given the
multiplicity of interests in the sea or, even lack of interest, on
the part of the states concerned. If, however, these interests do
148An example is the Ca~ribean where regionalism cannot be
successfully developed unless Cuba is a part~cipant.
l490ne such catalyst is Arab oil policies which influence region-
alism in Northwestern Europe. For an indepth discussion on catalysts
in regionalism, see J.S. Nye, "Patterns and Catalysts in Regional
Integration," pp. 870-884.
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merge there will be increased possibilities for the development of a
regional law of the sea.
Final Note
At present it is felt that regionalism is not an extreme threat
to a unified law of the sea nor will it become so in the near future.
But as mo~e nations become interested in the seas adjacent to their
coast, an issue conducive to regional communication becomes more
viable. For regionalism to develop these contacts will be very
important. It will provide a means whereby common interests can be
promoted.
However, as this study has pointed out, the process of regionaliza-
tion does not have an easy path even in areas with a long history of
co-operation. The sea cannot only promote common intarests, it can
also change national policies and values, the result of which can be
deleterious to regional relations.
A ~egional law of the sea will not be developed quickly or easi~y.
There are too many variables tn too many regions for it to beco~e a
pervasive phenomenon for the near future. However, regionalism is
here to stay and will continue to .grow. World attention must be
focused on this fact and acco~odatedwithin an international ocean
policy.
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